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  INTRODUCTION   
In 2010, a seventy-year-old woman named Rajo Devi Lo-
han and her husband Balla took $3000 in loans for in vitro fer-
tilization (IVF) treatments in Baddhu Patti, India, to conceive 
their only child, Naveen, reportedly becoming the oldest mother 
in history.1 When reports suggested Rajo was dying at age 72, 
commentators quickly condemned her actions and the harm 
 
 1. World‟s Oldest New Mom Dying After IVF Pregnancy at Age 72, FOX 
NEWS.COM (June 16, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/06/16/worlds 
-oldest-new-mom-dying-ivf-pregnancy-age/. 
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they would foist on her daughter, Naveen.2 Should India have 
prohibited access to reproductive technologies beyond a certain 
maternal (and/or paternal) age, as several other countries have 
done? 
This is but one among a series of pressing questions about 
reproduction: Should the State permit anonymous sperm dona-
tion? Should brother-sister or first cousin-first cousin incest be-
tween adults be made criminal? Should the State fund absti-
nence education? What underlies all of these seemingly 
disparate questions (and many others) is whether the State can 
permissibly attempt to influence our decisions about whether, 
when, and with whom to reproduce. 
This turns out to be a question with far-reaching implica-
tions because such interventions take many forms, including 
criminal sanctions (e.g., incest laws), bodily intrusions (e.g., the 
sterilization of the institutionalized severely mentally re-
tarded), the nonrecognition of certain types of contracts (e.g., 
the nonenforcement of surrogacy contracts in many states in 
the United States), government subsidization of informational 
programs (e.g., the funding of abstinence education), and the 
regulation of businesses assisting in reproduction (e.g., the 
U.K. law requiring that all sperm donors place identifying in-
formation in a registry available to donor-conceived children at 
age eighteen).  
One prominent type of justification given for these (and a 
myriad of other) attempts to regulate reproduction is concern 
for the best interests of the children that will result from re-
production (sometimes also referred to as child welfare analy-
sis). For example, in the debate over whether the State or phy-
sicians should restrict access to reproductive technology for 
unmarried individuals,3 both sides cite to copious empirical  
literature on whether and to what extent children born into 
single-parent families suffer compared to those born into two-
parent families.4  
 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 642–45 (Ct. App. 2006) (denying fertility services to a les-
bian woman due to her sexuality, marital status, or both); Andrea D. Gur-
mankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 63–64 (2005). 
 4. See also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining 
the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1022 (2003) (noting that studies showing advantages in 
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This focus on the best interests of the resulting child is, on 
the surface, quite understandable. In authorizing adoption, in 
determining which parent should have custody upon divorce, in 
determining when a child should be removed from its family of 
origin and put into child protective services, and in countless 
other areas of family law, the protection of the best interests of 
existing children serves as a powerful organizing principle that 
justifies state intervention. 
While courts, legislatures, physicians, and commentators 
frequently speak in a parallel idiom to justify state regulation 
of reproduction, in this Article I show that such justifications 
are problematic. Drawing on insights from bioethics and the 
philosophy of identity relating to the so-called ―Non-Identity 
Problem,‖ I show why this form of justification, at least as typi-
cally stated, is fallacious. Unless the State‘s failure to intervene 
would foist upon the child a ―life not worth living,‖ any attempt 
to alter whether, when, or with whom an individual reproduces 
cannot be justified on the basis that harm will come to the re-
sulting child, since but for that intervention the child would not 
exist. To put the point in the language of distinctions I have 
developed in earlier work,5 legislatures, judges, and scholars 
problematically treat the reasons justifying state interference 
with an individual‘s right to remain the legal parent of an exist-
ing child as fully overlapping with the reasons justifying state 
interference with an individual‘s (potential) right to become a 
genetic parent and bring a child into existence. 
The best interests argument acts as a smoke screen that 
prevents us from excavating the true justification for these 
 
two-parent households ―have nothing to do with biology,‖ but instead are re-
lated to increased ―income, supervision, and parental attention‖); Marsha Gar-
rison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant 
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 861–65 (2005) (claiming that detriments to 
offspring of having single parents persist even when income is controlled for). 
Compare, e.g., Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Donor Insemination for Sin-
gle Heterosexual and Lesbian Women: Issues Concerning the Welfare of the 
Child, 9 HUM. REPROD. 1972, 1972 (1994), with Ethics Comm., Am. Soc‘y for 
Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried 
Persons, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1333, 1334 (2006), and Holly J. Harlow, 
Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking 
Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 173, 
196–98 (1996). 
 5. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140–41 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Constitution]; I. 
Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 
1122 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Genetic Parent]. 
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kinds of interventions. My larger project is to show a ―secret 
ambition‖ of best interests reasoning, whose significance ―lies 
not in what it says but in what it stops us from saying.‖6 That 
is, the way the ―idiom takes the political charge out of conten-
tious issues and deflects expressive contention away from the‖ 
law of reproduction.7 Because these regulations of reproduction 
are often justified by appeals to child welfare, we should under-
stand the dominance of that discourse as a palatable way of ar-
guing for much more controversial (illiberal, eugenic, etc.) 
ideas. While I am not claiming that there is an intentional  
misrepresentation on the part of scholars, legislatures, etc.—
reliance on best interests of the resulting child (BIRC) reason-
ing may be the product of a failure to adequately reflect on the 
issue, or what those disposed to psychoanalysis might call re-
pression—I do view my project as an unmasking one wherein I 
seek to reveal the real arguments that must stand behind these 
policies if they are to be justified, and expose those arguments 
to full scrutiny.8 
This Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I by offer-
ing a framework that describes the dimensions of the regula-
tion of reproduction. I show why best interests reasoning—a 
justificatory idiom prominent in family law—seems from a po-
litical theory perspective to be a very appealing method of justi-
fying government intervention in the reproductive area. I then 
show the subtle error made when transposing these arguments 
from the context of protecting already-existing children to the 
question of government programs that affect who will come into 
existence. Here I explain the Non-Identity Problem and show 
its implicit acceptance in the jurisprudence rejecting the wrong-
ful life tort. 
In Part II, I show that a wide swath of state interventions 
aimed at altering when, whether, and with whom we produce 
 
 6. I borrow the term ―secret ambition‖ from Dan Kahan‘s deployment of 
it in respect to ―deterrence,‖ Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (1999), although the idea obviously predates 
the term. 
 7. Id. at 417. More precisely, Kahan‘s claim is that ―the rhetoric of deter-
rence displaces an alternative expressive idiom that produces incessant illi-
beral conflict over status‖ such that ―[c]itizens of diverse commitments con-
verge on the deterrence idiom to satisfy social norms against contentious 
public moralizing; public officials likewise converge on it to minimize opposi-
tion to their preferred policy outcomes.‖ Id. 
 8. In this respect my approach differs from Kahan‘s, whose attitude to-
ward the ―secret ambition‖ of deterrence is more mixed. Id. at 477–500. 
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are nevertheless frequently justified (by courts, legislatures, 
and scholars) on precisely the BIRC justification that the Non-
Identity Problem suggests is problematic. I review examples of 
the (mis)use of this reasoning to support policies such as absti-
nence education, the prohibition on brother-sister incest, the 
barring of anonymity in sperm and egg donation, the prevent-
ing of reproductive technology access for single individuals, and 
others. In so doing I introduce a new distinction between what I 
call ―perfect‖ and ―imperfect‖ Non-Identity Problems, and show 
that in the perfect cases BIRC justifications are a normative 
nonstarter.  
In Part III, I consider three attempts to reformulate the 
BIRC justification in a way that is not self-defeating and can 
support the types of interventions I have discussed in Part II. 
The first attempts to expand the category of lives not worth liv-
ing for which no Non-Identity Problem occurs. The second 
draws a distinction between perfect and imperfect Non-Identity 
Problems and suggests BIRC reasoning is only problematic for 
the perfect cases. The third adapts a framework offered by phi-
losophers for the wrongfulness of creating children with lives 
not worth living that does not rely on BIRC-type reasoning by 
appealing to what they call ―non-person-affecting principles‖ 
and ―same-number substitutions‖ of higher for lower welfare 
persons. I show that each is problematic as a BIRC substitute 
for a number of reasons. Finally, I briefly examine what signi-
ficance these normative criticisms of BIRC and its three refor-
mulations have for the constitutionality of these laws. 
If BIRC and its reformulations fail, are these regulations of 
reproduction wholly unjustified? In the conclusion, I briefly plot 
four very different ways of justifying the regulation of repro-
duction on substitute theories relating to legal moralism, virtue 
ethics, reproductive externalities, and wronging-while-overall-
benefiting. Developing these theories and their problems is a 
task I undertake in a companion paper that will come out in a 
different issue of this Journal.9 
If the argument I make here succeeds, it shows that a large 
swath of the judicial, legislative, and academic discourse about 
regulating reproduction is incoherent and that many regula-
tions of reproduction are, based on the justifications given for 
them and reasonable reformulations thereof, normatively and 
 
 9. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
Apr. 2012).  
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(to a lesser extent) constitutionally problematic. Once BIRC 
justifications are rejected, it becomes apparent that either 
these forms of reproductive regulation are unjustified or quite 
different sorts of justifications must be relied on, carrying dis-
turbing illiberal or eugenic premises. My aim is nothing short 
of re-writing our way of thinking about the regulation of  
reproduction. 
I.   THE REGULATION OF REPRODUCTION AND THE 
ATTRACTION OF (AND PROBLEM WITH) BEST 
INTERESTS REASONING   
In this Part, I set out a taxonomy of state interventions 
aimed at influencing reproductive technology. I show that one 
form of justification for intervention, what I call Best Interests 
of the Resulting Child (BIRC) reasoning, has been transposed 
from family law where its analogue, Best Interests of Existing 
Children reasoning, serves as one of the organizing principles. I 
show that it is an attractive kind of justificatory move, in politi-
cal philosophical terms, because it marshals a particular kind 
of third-party effect as a ground for limiting autonomous ac-
tion: harm to a vulnerable third party to whom parents stand 
in a fiduciary relationship—their child. I then demonstrate why 
reasoning associated with the Non-Identity Problem makes this 
transposition problematic. Finally, I show that my argument 
has implicitly been accepted in one area of U.S. law: the rejec-
tion of wrongful life tort suits in almost every state.  
All this serves as a prelude to showing in the next Part 
that, despite this problem with BIRC justifications, a large 
number of interventions that seek to influence whether, when, 
and with whom we reproduce are indeed justified by courts, 
legislatures, and scholars on exactly this problematic ground. 
I should make clear up front that my starting point about 
human reproduction is a modestly libertarian view; the State 
has to offer some justification for limiting individuals‘ repro-
ductive choices, although I am open to such justifications tak-
ing many different forms.10  
 
 10. While I think this is an intuitive and logical starting point that 
matches the preconceived notions most of us have about our reproductive 
lives, it is not the only possible one. We could instead hypothetically begin 
with a view that individuals have no freedom to reproduce except in the cases 
where the State grants them that privilege and start by asking whether a par-
ticular instance of reproduction is one that the State should justifiably permit. 
That flip would certainly change things rhetorically, but the same intellectual 
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A. THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF STATE INTERVENTIONS AIMED 
AT INFLUENCING REPRODUCTION 
I find it useful to describe State attempts to influence re-
production through a taxonomy with three dimensions I have 
come up with, which I will return to throughout the Article. 
The first dimension is the target reproductive decision (or 
simply ―target‖ for short) the State seeks to influence. For our 
purposes we can crudely distinguish three such targets: wheth-
er, when, and with whom individuals reproduce.11  
Programs that sterilize the severely mentally ill or deny 
access to reproductive technologies to those over age fifty affect 
whether these individuals will reproduce. Abstinence education 
aims to delay reproduction by teenagers or other unmarried in-
dividuals and thus influences when individuals reproduce. Pro-
hibitions on brother-sister incest, programs aimed at carrier 
screening for Tay-Sachs or other heritable genetic disorders, 
and statutes barring sperm donor anonymity attempt to influ-
ence with whom individuals reproduce.  
The second dimension goes to the means by which the State 
seeks to influence the target decisions (―means‖ for short). These 
interventions can roughly be ordered from strongest to weakest 
in terms of their level of intrusion. Physical alteration is the 
most intrusive, for example, sterilization of the severely men-
tally retarded. Criminal prohibition is also extremely intrusive, 
for example, making it a crime to engage in brother-sister in-
cest or to purchase surrogacy services. Less intrusively, the 
State may make certain status determinations immutable (par-
ticularly as to parentage) and/or make contracts surrounding 
reproduction unenforceable; for example, California treats ges-
tational surrogacy contracts (where the surrogate carries the 
fetus to term but does not contribute the egg for fertilization) as 
enforceable but not traditional surrogacy contracts (where the 
surrogate is both the genetic mother and carries the fetus to 
term).12 More weakly, the State may also create default status 
determinations and set the altering rules, for example, the older 
 
problem would largely persist. Thus, while I offer my analysis here in the 
more common frame, those who are attracted to the other frame can reverse 
engineer what I say. 
 11. For other purposes, the ―how‖ dimension—for example, whether to 
permit cloning as a form of reproduction—may also matter, but not for the ex-
amples I discuss. 
 12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993); In re Mar-
riage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900–01 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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version of the Uniform Parentage Act still in place in many ju-
risdictions absolves a sperm donor of parental responsibilities 
only if the recipient was married and the procedure was done 
through a licensed physician, thereby setting conditions to 
overcome a default parentage rule.13 Still less intrusively, the 
State may selectively fund certain types of reproductive assis-
tance—in the United States a number of states use state-level 
insurance mandates to force insurers to cover IVF (an extreme-
ly expensive procedure), but use them selectively to fund only 
particular types of reproduction through language limiting it to 
married individuals, thus excluding single individuals and gays 
and lesbians.14 An even less intrusive intervention is informa-
tional, for example, the State‘s funding of abstinence education 
or public health campaigns encouraging carrier testing for Tay-
Sachs and other heritable genetic disorders.  
The third dimension goes to the justification or, more often, 
justifications that are, or could be, offered in favor of these in-
terventions (―justification‖ for short). At a high and somewhat 
crude level, it is useful to distinguish four different families of 
justifications: (1) the Harm Principle, tracing back to John 
Stuart Mill, suggesting that prevention of harm to others is a 
justification for state action; (2) Paternalism, the argument 
that the prevention of harm to the actor herself—usually call-
ing on some conception of false consciousness or bounded ratio-
nality—is a justification for state action; (3) Wronging Without 
Harming, the argument that preventing the wronging (usually 
in a deontological sense) of another, even if one does not harm 
him, is a justification for state action; finally, (4) Moralism and 
Virtue, suggesting that though a particular action causes nei-
ther harm to the actor nor to third parties, its negative effects 
on public morality generally or the virtue/character of individ-
ual actors is a justification for state action.15  
 
 13. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 377, 408 (1973). 
 14. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive 
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 536–40 (2010). 
 15. Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM 
TO OTHERS 26–27 (1984) (developing a much-fuller taxonomy of justifications 
for criminal law interventions). The non-person-affecting principle approach I 
discuss in Part III may actually fall between boxes of this taxonomy. As al-
ways, taxonomies are useful rough approximations of the world, but like maps, 
they necessarily lose some of the details. 
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For our purposes, it is useful to further subdivide the 
Harm Principle form of justification to distinguish between 
claims of harm to the children (the BIRC justification) and 
claims of harm to other third-parties (a reproductive externali-
ties justification I discuss toward the end of this Article).  
The three dimensions and their elements are summarized 
in Table 1 and can be used to describe many regulations of re-
production. 
For example, abstinence education is aimed at influencing 
when individuals reproduce (target), does so through informa-
tion provision (means), and is typically justified based on a 
Harm Principle rationale targeting the interests of the children 
who will result from teenage pregnancy as well as legal moral-
ism aimed at discouraging premarital sex (justification), 
though other forms of justification are possible. Prohibitions on 
sperm donor anonymity influence with whom individuals re-
produce (target) through criminal prohibition (means) and are 
typically justified through a Harm Principle rationale targeting 
the interests of the children who will result (justification). 
As is often the case in the fractal world of legal analysis, 
things can thus get much more complex, but for present pur-
poses these three dimensions are a useful starting point and I 
will only add additional layers of complexity as needed.16 While 
I have designed this taxonomy for this project and its aims, I 
also think the taxonomy is very useful on its own. 
 
 
 16. To wit, I will add a fourth dimension relating to perfect and imperfect 
Non-Identity Problems and I briefly discuss distinctions as to the severity of 
the reproductive interests that are being stymied—for example, a governmen-
tal intervention that prevented you from having an eighth genetically related 
child when you already had seven might be viewed quite differently than an 
intervention that prevented you from having any genetically related children, 
and short delays in the timing of reproduction might be thought of as less se-
vere than longer ones. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Shaping Future Children: Pa-
rental Rights and Societal Interests, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 380 (2005); Cohen, 
Genetic Parent, supra note 5, at 1194; Daniel Statman, The Right to Parent-
hood: An Argument for a Narrow Interpretation, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 224, 227–
228 (2003). One could also draw an additional prior distinction between State 
attempts to influence the reproduction of others (the focus of this Article) ver-
sus attempts by other individuals (for example, charities offering voluntary 
sterilization programs for poor women).  
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B. THE PROMINENCE OF BEST INTERESTS REASONING IN FAMILY 
LAW AND ITS ATTRACTION AS A JUSTIFICATORY MOVE 
As the mapping in the prior Section suggests, the BIRC 
form of justification for regulation of reproduction focuses on a 
Millian Harm Principle17 and applies it to a particularly vul-
nerable group—children who result from reproduction. From a 
political theory perspective, this idiom is a very attractive way 
to justify state interference with reproductive decision making 
because it justifies that interference for the sake of preventing 
harm to society‘s most vulnerable, children.18 Harm Principle 
 
 17. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Albury Castell ed., 
F.S. Crofts & Co. 1947) (1859) (establishing the Millian Harm Principle). 
 18. To be precise, on at least some usages, what is called best interests 
actually exceeds that which is prohibited by the Harm Principle. Richard F. 
Storrow has captured a similar point nicely: ―although exposing children to 
serious harm is of necessity inconsistent with their best interests, what is not 
best for a child does not necessarily harm the child.‖ Richard F. Storrow, The 
Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Ga-
tekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2300–01 (2007). Are 
the types of cases I discuss in this Article harm prevention or benefit confer-
ral? To ask the question demonstrates the baseline problem we face, a point I 
return to in discussing enhancement below. Nevertheless, because my goal is 
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arguments are typically accepted even by libertarians as a 
proper justification for liberty-limiting government regulation, 
including criminal sanctions. Further, with harm to children 
arguments there are no issues of consent or contributory fault, 
and as a matter of human psychology, the suffering of children 
is a particularly potent call for action. Thus, BIRC is an attrac-
tive justificatory idiom because it relies on relatively uncontro-
versial premises that permit an overlapping consensus between 
otherwise divergent comprehensive moral theories, such as wel-
farism, libertarianism, etc.19 
BIRC is also an attractive justificatory idiom because it can 
draw on a parallel idiom in family law as to the importance of 
Best Interests of Existing Children, one of the central organiz-
ing principles of family law. Although it is sometimes called 
child welfare or harm prevention, I will just use best interests 
from here on out. This idiom has origins in the United States 
going back to at least the 1830s.20 For example, in determining 
child custody in a divorce proceeding, many states suggest that 
the best interests of the child is to be considered, with thirty-
five states listing the welfare of the child as the sole considera-
tion.21 Many state statutes have a presumption that the legal 
 
to defeat the application of best interests reasoning in this context, I want to 
be as generous as possible to my interlocutor. Therefore, for present purposes I 
will grant that all interventions justified on BIRC reasoning that I discuss can 
benefit from the political theoretical cover of the Harm Principle, even though 
I think the point is arguable. As a terminological matter it might be more pre-
cise to describe the Harm Principle as a commitment to the view that harm to 
others is the only basis for justifying the State‘s ability to limit liberty, but in 
what follows I will speak more loosely about going ―beyond‖ the Harm Prin-
ciple versus sticking to it. 
 19. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144 (rev. ed. 2005). Of 
course, even the command ―protect children from harm‖ may not forge a com-
plete overlapping consensus in that it may require subscription to particular 
concepts of what constitutes ―harm,‖ for example, whether being born deaf 
harms children or instead enables them to be a participant in deaf culture. 
See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, 
and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 349–50 (2008). But the BIRC ap-
proach, if it was valid, would certainly be able to forge much more of an over-
lapping consensus than many of the views I canvass below. 
 20. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 
653 (2006) (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND 
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 241 (1985)); Lynne Marie 
Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in 
American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 340–50 (2008). 
 21. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children‟s Existing Rights in 
State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
845, 907–11 (2003) (collecting statutes).  
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parent will have visitation rights with the child even when they 
are the noncustodial parent but that the court may terminate 
those rights on a showing that the child‘s welfare would be se-
riously endangered.22 In adoption, the state investigates poten-
tial adopters, qualifying some and disqualifying others, to en-
sure that allowing the adoptive parents to become the parents 
of the child is in the child‘s best interests.23 Despite constitu-
tional law protecting parents‘ right to raise their child in their 
faith, religiously motivated refusal of needed treatment for the 
child will be overruled when the activity endangers a child‘s life 
and in some jurisdictions if it endangers the child‘s health as 
well.24  
In these and other family law settings the central model is 
the same: ―[t]he state appropriately steps in, as parens patriae 
protector of the welfare of these nonautonomous persons, to act 
in their behalf, choosing for them‖ when their welfare is threat-
ened by parental action.25 From a political-theory perspective, 
the best interests justification is a very powerful one, overrul-
ing what would otherwise be a forbidden state intrusion into 
the private realm of family decision making.  
One way of understanding the prominence of BIRC justifi-
cations for the regulation of reproduction, then, is as transposi-
tion of reasoning from family law into the law of reproduction. 
The analogy goes: protecting the best interests of existing 
children is to the constitutional protections against interference 
in child rearing and legal parenthood (family autonomy) as pro-
tecting the best interests of resulting children is to the consti-
tutional protections against interference in reproductive deci-
sions (reproductive autonomy). Both are constitutionally 
protected spheres where the state is usually restrained from in-
 
 22. See id. at 933–34 (collecting statutes).  
 23. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-308(b) (2002) (mandating 
court consideration of potential adoptive parents); Dwyer, supra note 21, at 
882–904 (surveying existing adoption law by state). 
 24. See, e.g., Kei Robert Hirasawa, Note, Are Parents Acting in the Best 
Interests of Their Children When They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their 
Religious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 317–24 (2006) (collecting cases and 
histories); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, “In God We Trust”: When Parents 
Refuse Medical Treatment for Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Reli-
gious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 142 & n.79 (1993). 
 25. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States‟ Continued 
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 411 
(2008). 
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terfering but where such interference is nevertheless justified 
in order to protect child welfare.  
To be a little more precise, on the existing child side, U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions like Meyer v. Nebraska,26 Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters,27 Prince v. Massachusetts,28 and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder29 all recognize a broad family autonomy principle pro-
tecting parental-rearing decisions but also the need to subordi-
nate family privacy when there are serious threats to child wel-
fare. As is relevant for our purposes, the reason why the State 
can permissibly interfere in parental decision making in order 
to protect child welfare appears somewhat over-determined in 
these family privacy cases. The predominant strand ties it to 
child vulnerability: children are at the mercy of the parents, 
walled off from the assistance of any other agents of protection 
and socialization but for state intervention.30 This strand con-
nects the protection of children to the protection of other vul-
nerable populations such as mentally incompetent adults, with 
the State stepping in as parens patriae.31 There is, however, a 
second strand present in these opinions in which protecting 
child welfare is merely an instrumental good in ensuring future 
citizens capable of participating in a democratic society. We can 
call these two the ―vulnerability‖ and ―social planning‖ strands, 
respectively. As to existing children, the two strands operate to 
some extent in tandem in that the State intervenes to protect 
children from, for example, an abusive home environment be-
cause the child is vulnerable and because failure to do so will 
result in a child who cannot appropriately carry the mantle of 
citizen. In the realm of regulating reproduction, however, the 
two strands pull apart conceptually. I will argue that there is a 
pervasive tendency to substitute the language of children‘s in-
terest for what can really be justified only on the basis of so-
cietal interest. 
 
 26. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
 27. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 28. 321 U.S. 158, 165–66 (1944). 
 29. 406 U.S. 205, 221–22, 230–34 (1972). 
 30. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion 
Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 415–16 (2008) (ar-
guing that this jurisprudence reflects the Lockean premise that ―children are 
self-evidently vulnerable, particularly relative to adults, and require special 
solicitude and protection‖ and that ―[p]arents have the first duty and first 
right to shield their vulnerable children; if they fail, the state may intervene 
on the children‘s behalf ‖). 
 31. Dwyer, supra note 25. 
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C. THE PROBLEM WITH BEST INTERESTS 
As I have said, there is a logical problem with attempts to 
have best interests reasoning play a limiting role in reproduc-
tive autonomy analogous to its role limiting family autonomy. 
The problem is that in the latter context there is an appeal to 
the best interests of the existing child while in the reproductive 
context the appeal is actually to best interests of the resulting 
child. Whenever the proposed intervention will itself determine 
whether or not a particular child will come into existence, best 
interests arguments premised on that child‘s welfare are prob-
lematic. 
This point is at the core of the ―Non-Identity Problem‖ de-
veloped by Derek Parfit, a problem that has been the subject of 
a great deal of philosophical attention since the publication of 
Parfit‘s Reasons and Persons in 1984.32 The punch line of the 
problem is that we cannot be said to harm children by creating 
them as long as we do not give them a life not worth living.33 I 
will have more to say about the boundaries of the concept of a 
―life not worth living‖ in Part III, but the basic idea is that it is 
a life so full of pain and suffering and so devoid of anything 
good that the individual would prefer never to have come into 
existence.  
The easiest version of the problem to see involves regula-
tion of whether individuals reproduce, for example, the denials 
of access to reproductive technology to gay, aged, or single par-
ents. Imagine that sixty-year-old Ethel wants to have a baby 
through reproductive technology and assume arguendo that 
this child, Maxwell, will be worse off (physiologically, psycho-
 
 32. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358–59 (rev. ed. 1987); see, 
e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUS-
TICE 224 (2000); Dan W. Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic 
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269 (1995); Dena S. 
Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child‟s Right to an Open Future, 27 HAST-
INGS CENTER REP. 7, 12–13 (1997); James Woodward, The Non-Identity Prob-
lem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986). For an in-depth treatment in the context of access 
to reproductive technologies, see John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and 
Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004). For 
my own discussion of the problem in the context of tort liability for intention-
ally creating children with disabilities, see generally Cohen & Chen, supra 
note 14. 
 33. This is sometimes also referred to as a ―life not worth living.‖ E.g., 
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 233; FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 98–104; 
Seana V. Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Signific-
ance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 118 (1999).  
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logically, etc.) than would the average child born to a woman in 
her twenties. We cannot say that a state law preventing Ethel‘s 
access to reproductive technology at her age furthers the wel-
fare of Maxwell, because if the State blocks that access Max-
well will never exist and, so long as he has a life worth living, 
coming into existence does not harm him. Thus, any state in-
tervention influencing whether individuals reproduce (absent 
lives not worth living)34 cannot be justified by BIRC reasoning. 
A similar problem extends to attempts to influence when 
and with whom individuals reproduce. Parfit‘s primary discus-
sion of this problem in Reasons and Persons is that of a four-
teen-year-old girl who has a child and gives it a bad start in life 
by not waiting to have a child until she is older.35 Parfit states 
that we tried and failed to persuade her on the grounds that it 
is worse for her and for her resulting child, that the child would 
have a bad start in life, and asks: 
Were we right to claim that her decision was worse for her child? If 
she had waited, this particular child would never have existed. And, 
despite its bad start, his life is worth living. Suppose first that we do 
not believe that causing to exist can benefit. We should ask, ‗If some-
one lives a life that is worth living, is this worse for this person than 
if he had never existed?‘ Our answer must be No. Suppose next that 
we believe that causing to exist can benefit. On this view, this girl‘s 
decision benefits her child. 
  On both views, this girl‘s decision was not worse for her child. 
When we see this, do we change our mind about this decision? Do we 
cease to believe that it would have been better if this girl had waited, 
so that she could give to her first child a better start in life? I continue 
to have this belief, as do most of those who consider this case. But we 
cannot defend this belief in the natural way that I suggested. We 
cannot claim that this girl‘s decision was worse for her child. What is 
the objection to her decision? This question arises because, in the dif-
ferent outcomes, different people would be born. I shall therefore call 
this the Non-Identity Problem.36 
Thus, here too the usual (what Parfit calls ―person-
affecting‖)37 conception of harm of the BIRC argument cannot 
be the basis for justifying attempts to alter when individuals 
reproduce—such as state funding of teenage abstinence pro-
grams or implanting of Norplant or other temporary forms of 
birth control in women convicted of multiple counts of drug 
 
 34. From here on in I stop repeating the proviso ―absent lives not worth 
living‖ but intend it to be implied throughout. 
 35. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 358. 
 36. Id. at 358–59. 
 37. Id. at 393–95. 
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possession.38 A similar logic applies to interventions regulating 
with whom individuals reproduce, for example the criminaliza-
tion of adult brother-sister incest in the United States and 
many foreign countries.  
At this juncture it is worth clarifying that none of this de-
pends on any assumption that children are harmed if they are 
not brought into existence. Instead, I share with others the 
view that ―no one is harmed in not being created, because there 
is no one to be harmed if we do not create someone . . . .‖39 
Thus, accepting this insight in no way implies a conclusion that 
parents do wrong by failing to have the largest number of 
children they can or that they harm a particular child by failing 
to create the child.40 All it entails is that no one is harmed by 
being created if he or she is given a life worth living. I emphas-
ize this point, because it is common source of confusion. 
In one respect, the ―whether‖ case is an easier one for rul-
ing out BIRC justifications than the ―with whom,‖ and especial-
ly the ―when‖ case. In these latter cases the claim depends on 
the assumption that changing which sperm meets which egg, 
that is changing which child genetically speaking is conceived, 
is sufficient to produce a Non-Identity Problem that rules out 
BIRC justifications. This is a relatively weak assumption. It 
does not require subscription to a strong form of genetic essen-
tialism—the view that your genes determine who you are—but 
 
 38. To be clear, in the cases discussed in this Article, the delay has to be 
one as to when sperm and egg meet. Compare that to a different delay: a hus-
band and wife fertilize pre-embryos as part of IVF at Time 1, but choose to im-
plant the pre-embryo either at Time 1 + 1 year, or after cryopreservation at 
Time 1 + 5 years. In many of Part II‘s examples, the regulation that influences 
when and with whom we reproduce will also change other facets of an individ-
ual‘s life—like the date on which he or she is born or who his or her rearing 
parents are—that might also be thought to alter identity in the relevant sense. 
While I do not think these additional facts are necessary to produce a Non-
Identity Problem (i.e., it is enough for a different sperm-egg combination to 
occur), I leave open the question of whether they might nonetheless be suffi-
cient to do so in some cases even if the same sperm meets the same egg. If they 
were sufficient, a still-wider swath of the regulation of reproduction might be 
subject to the Non-Identity Problem; for example, rules regarding the en-
forcement of pre-embryo disposition agreements that may alter when pre-
embryos are implanted. See generally Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 5. 
 39. F. M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL‘Y 65, 72 (2000). 
 40. It is at least possible that this conclusion may be entailed by one of the 
competitor views to BIRC as a justification for regulating reproduction, the 
non-person-affecting principle approach, a matter I discuss below. See infra 
Part III.C.  
 440 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:423 
 
is instead entirely compatible with the view that given a cer-
tain complement of genes you could become any number of dif-
ferent kinds of people from the point of view of what philoso-
phers sometimes call ―narrative identity.‖41 Genetic identity 
does not ensure narrative identity—identical twins share the 
same genes but are different people. Thus, it is also not a claim 
about identity and lack thereof in all senses of the word. It is 
the weak claim that if we want to know whether the person 
that results from the particular sperm and egg combination 
would be harmed, we cannot say that it would further the wel-
fare of that person if we instead substituted a different sperm 
and egg combination. Philosophers often refer to this as ―nu-
merical identity,‖ two entities are not the same because there 
are two of them.42 
To put it tangibly: my mother was married once, without 
children, before she had me with her second husband. Imagine 
we concluded (counterfactually I hope!) that on the day of my 
conception she had instead conceived with her first husband 
the resulting child—call him Gabriel—who would have been 
healthier or in other ways had a better life than I did. All the 
Non-Identity Problem requires accepting is that if we want to 
know whether my life harms me (i.e., is Glenn harmed) it 
would be wrong to compare Glenn‘s life to the life Gabriel 
would have had. That comparison might be relevant for some 
other purposes—indeed the non-person-affecting principle ap-
proach I discuss in Part III focuses on it—but is not relevant to 
the question of whether Glenn has been harmed by being born. 
For that question the correct comparison is Glenn‘s life versus 
Glenn‘s nonexistence, not Glenn‘s life versus Gabriel‘s. I believe 
Parfit is right on this issue of alterations of ―when‖ or ―with 
 
 41. David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, THE STANFORD EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford 
.edu/entries/identity-ethics/. 
 42. Harold Noonan, Identity, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., rev. ed. 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
entries/identity/ (―To say that things are identical is to say that they are the 
same. ‗Identity‘ and ‗sameness‘ mean the same; their meanings are identical. 
However, they have more than one meaning. A distinction is customarily 
drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with 
qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitative-
ly identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they 
share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, 
but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical 
identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold be-
tween a thing and itself.‖). 
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whom‖ we reproduce, and in what follows I will examine the 
consequences for the law.43  
I have also purposefully restricted my canvas in this Ar-
ticle to cases where the State seeks to influence who will be 
conceived not who will be born to bracket (for present purposes) 
three additional more controversial questions. The first ques-
tion concerns whether Non-Identity Problems can result from 
genetic manipulations of early embryos, and which kinds of 
manipulations—an issue I have discussed in other work con-
cerning tort liability for parents who use reproductive technol-
ogies to purposefully create children with disabilities; these 
cases raise the further question of whether genetic manipula-
tions rather than changing conception can give rise to Non-
Identity Problems.44 The second question concerns the inter-
play between Non-Identity Problems and the abortion right, a 
case I believe requires a quite different analysis: On the one 
hand, while no one is harmed if not conceived, on some views of 
fetal personhood the fetus may be harmed if aborted, creating a 
divergence from my cases. On the other hand, for some writers 
that defend the abortion right as a right not to be a gestational 
parent that is tied to bodily integrity, that right exists irrespec-
tive of fetal person such that this divergence may be irrele-
vant.45 Thus, my analysis here does not necessarily cut in any 
direction on the abortion debate, except to render more proble-
matic a small strand of reasoning occasionally presented that 
parallels BIRC by defending the abortion right on the basis of 
harm to children of growing up unwanted or out-of-wedlock.46 
 
 43. For those who are not unpersuaded, the analysis of regulations that 
cover many of the interventions in Part II on ―whether‖ individuals reproduce 
should still be relevant, since it does not rely on this tie between genes and 
identity. How the Non-Identity Problem interfaces with religious views of en-
soulment I leave to religious scholars and self-consciously do not address here. 
 44. In a symposium issue in which we both participated, Kirsten Smo-
lensky argued that such manipulations can never create Non-Identity Prob-
lems, Kristen Smolensky, Creating Children With Disabilities: Parental Tort 
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 
331–36 (2008), while I argued against that conclusion, Cohen, supra note 19, 
at 350–59.  
 45. See, e.g., Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 5, at 1132; Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48–49 (1971) (groun-
ding a defense of abortion in the thought experiment of waking up one morn-
ing to find a world-famous violinist connected to your vital organs without 
your permission). 
 46. That strand is one way to read the passage in Roe v. Wade noting that 
―[t]here is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted 
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The third question relates to regulation of multiple gestation, 
made (in)famous by the ―octomom‖ news coverage.47 Whether 
Non-Identity Problems occur here might depend on how mul-
tiple gestation came about (e.g., multiple implantation versus 
fertility drug use) and whether Non-Identity Problems occur 
with harms to already-existing pre-embryos. There are many 
complications here—indeed one might conclude that some of 
the multiple gestating pre-embryos are harmed while others 
are not48—but for this Article I stick to simpler cases which, as 
we will see, are not nearly as simple as they might appear. 
D. AN ANALOGY TO WRONGFUL LIFE CASES 
At this juncture some readers might react: ―That is philo-
sophically interesting, but it seems like an intriguing puzzle 
that would never motivate judges or other legal actors.‖ To the 
contrary, there is an area of law where courts and legislatures 
 
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.‖ 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 47. Randall C. Archibold, Octuplets, 6 Siblings, and Many Questions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/us/04octuplets.html? 
ref=nadyasuleman. 
 48. To hum only the first few bars of a very complex set of questions: first 
imagine a woman is deciding how many of six pre-embryos to implant at once. 
If we knew that the prevailing legal rule would cause her to implant all six at 
once or each of the six seriatim, one might not think there is a Non-Identity 
Problem since the same six (genetically speaking) children will come into exis-
tence, the only question is whether they will suffer the deficits of womb shar-
ing or not. Even this conclusion will depend on the issue alluded to above, su-
pra note 38, of whether changes in sperm-egg combination are only sufficient 
or actually necessary to produce a Non-Identity Problem. Contrast this with a 
case where which of two legal rules was adopted to regulate multiple gestation 
will cause the prospective mother to either implant all six at once, or only im-
plant two pre-embryos seriatim (due to cost or some other reason). Now there 
is no Non-Identity Problem as to the two, because the two would have been 
implanted either way, but there may be a Non-Identity Problem as to the four 
whose implantation depends on the prevailing legal rule. Actually, on some 
views about whether fertilized pre-embryos are the kinds of things that are 
harmed by not being implanted, the answer here might depend on whether the 
prevailing legal rule alters how many pre-embryos are implanted versus how 
many are fertilized to begin with. Finally, contrast these two cases with still 
another case where multiple gestation occurs due to the use of a fertility drug, 
and but-for the use of the fertility drug all the fetuses that come into being 
would be the result of different sperm-egg combinations—here it seems as 
though the Non-Identity Problem affects all of the fetuses and thus the claim 
that the fertility drug should be banned due to harm to these children. This is 
merely a taste of the complexities involved in reasoning about the Non-
Identity Problem in the multiple gestation context, one of the reasons I put it 
to the side in this Article since it deserves its own separate analysis elsewhere. 
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have implicitly paid attention to insights akin to those of the 
Non-Identity Problem: wrongful life tort suits. Thus, even a 
judge or scholar uninterested in the philosophical soundness of 
the BIRC justification should be troubled by the doctrinal rejec-
tion of the equivalent argument in a cognate area of law. 
Although the nomenclature is somewhat fluid, ―wrongful 
birth‖ suits are typically brought by parents of an unhealthy 
(but planned for) child against the medical professional who 
performed a genetic test on them or the fetus, or the one who 
interpreted the test or informed them of the results. The claim 
is that the professional behaved negligently, and but-for that 
negligence (i.e., had the parents received the proper results) the 
parents would have avoided conception or terminated the preg-
nancy.49 By contrast, in a ―wrongful life‖ suit the child that re-
sults brings action as him or herself under similar circum-
stances, with the claim being that ―the operable injury is the 
child‘s life itself, with nonexistence identified as the preferred 
alternative.‖50 
Only tort liability in wrongful life cases would run afoul of 
the Non-Identity Problem because (assuming they are given a 
life worth living) the children born cannot be said to be harmed 
by their conception, for had their parents been properly in-
formed of the risk of their health difficulties and delayed con-
ception or chosen a different reproductive partner, they would 
not have come into existence; instead a different child would 
have. In a wrongful birth case the parents claim that they have 
been harmed, not that the child has been, so no Non-Identity 
Problem arises. While they seldom speak in philosophical 
terms, this key insight of the Non-Identity Problem has been 
implicitly accepted by the federal courts and the vast majority 
of state courts when they reject wrongful life torts.51  
 
 49. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 
1987) (Hemophilia B); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990) (anhi-
drotic ectodermal dysplasia). For a listing of leading cases by jurisdiction, see 
Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life 
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 114, 160 n.141 (2005).  
 50. E.g., Hensel, supra note 49, at 143. Both can be contrasted with 
―wrongful pregnancy‖ or ―wrongful conception‖ cases, in which parents sue for 
the birth of a healthy but unplanned for child, often the result of a negligently 
performed tubal ligation or other procedure aimed at blocking reproduction. 
E.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ohio 2000); Hensel, supra 
note 49, at 151 n.53, 152–53 & 153 n.61. 
 51. Hensel, supra note 49, at 161 (noting only three U.S. states permit 
wrongful life suits with the rest rejecting them). 
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Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, for example, in-
volved a Mother who sought genetic counseling regarding her 
first trimester fetus due to the existence of other children in the 
family with Hemophilia.52 She told the doctor she would seek 
an abortion if the child was likely to be a hemophiliac, but due 
to a misdiagnosis ended up giving birth to a child with Hemo-
philia B and brought actions for wrongful life and wrongful 
birth.53 While the Illinois Supreme Court permitted the wrong-
ful birth cause of action to go forward it rejected the wrongful 
life action, sharing with other courts ―the belief that human 
life, no matter how burdened, is, as a matter of law, always pre-
ferable to nonlife,‖ and thus it was ―reluctant to find that the 
infant ha[d] suffered a legally cognizable injury by being born 
with a congenital or genetic impairment as opposed to not be-
ing born at all.‖54 In chiding the lower court for analogizing to 
an ordinary prenatal injury claim, the court noted that in those 
cases ―if the defendant had not been negligent, then the child 
would have been born healthy.‖55 By contrast, 
[r]ecognition of a cause of action for wrongful life in this case 
would . . . require this court to find [the child] had an interest in 
avoiding his own birth, i.e., that there is a fundamental legal right 
not to be born when birth would necessarily entail a life of hardship,56 
and the court reasoned that ―[s]uch a finding, however, would 
essentially require us to possess the divine ability to determine 
what defects should prevent an embryo from being allowed life 
so that denial of the opportunity to terminate the existence of 
such a defective child in embryo supports a cause of action.‖57 
This last line amounts to a recognition both that the Non-
Identity Problem poses no obstacle for a case involving a child 
on whom there has been conferred a life not worth living, along 
with a judicial reluctance to identify what lives fall into that 
category (where liability would be appropriate). 
Similarly in Nelson v. Krusen, the Texas Supreme Court 
rejected wrongful life liability in a claim involving a negligent 
 
 52. 512 N.E.2d at 693–95. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 697 (citations omitted); see id. at 703–07 (allowing the parents‘ 
wrongful birth action to move forward). 
 55. Id. at 698. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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failure to diagnose the genetic mother as a carrier of Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy.58 The court held: 
In this, as in all wrongful life cases, however, there is no allegation 
that but for the defendant‘s negligence the child would have had a 
healthy, unimpaired life. Instead, the claim is that without the doc-
tor‘s negligence the plaintiff never would have been born. Thus, the 
cause of action unavoidably involves the relative benefits of an im-
paired life as opposed to no life at all. All courts, even the ones recog-
nizing a cause of action for wrongful life, have admitted that this cal-
culation is impossible. . . . [T]his is not just a case in which the 
damages evade precise measurement. Here, it is impossible to ration-
ally decide whether the plaintiff has been damaged at all.59  
Thus the key insight of the Non-Identity Problem has al-
ready been recognized by courts and the problem is not merely 
of philosophical interest, but one that is already part of our ju-
risprudence.  
II.  THE PERSISTENCE OF BEST INTERESTS: SOME 
EXAMPLES FROM LEGISLATURES, COURTS, AND 
SCHOLARS   
Given the logic of the Non-Identity Problem and the accep-
tance of the implications of the problem by courts in the wrong-
ful life context, one might expect legal scholars, judges, and leg-
islators to avoid making BIRC arguments for attempts to 
influence, when, whether, and with whom we reproduce. In-
deed, the idea I have presented hopefully now seems so clearly 
correct that you might find it hard to believe that this error is 
widespread. Strikingly, as I show in this Part, this reasoning 
appears to persist in a wide swath of cases. On some occasions 
it is the primary justification for the policy offered, while in 
others it is one justification among others (for example, along-
side Paternalism and Commodification concerns in the regula-
tion of surrogacy agreements). I say ―appears‖ quite deliberate-
ly because all texts are somewhat ambiguous. While the most 
natural reading of these sources seems to me the invocation of 
the BIRC argument, it is at least possible that in some in-
stances the argument is instead shorthand for one of the three 
arguments I discuss in Part III (particularly the non-person-
affecting principle approach). It is also possible that this ambi-
guity represents the dressing up of controversial premises in a 
palatable idiom.  
 
 58. 678 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1984). 
 59. Id. at 925. 
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My ambition here is not psychoanalytic. I do not purport to 
delve into the minds of these players and show what they ―real-
ly‖ were thinking, or suggest that they are trying to obfuscate. 
Instead, I will merely suggest that if these sources are really 
making BIRC arguments (my own view of the matter) then 
what I say in this and the preceding Part shows why it is un-
workable. If instead they unintentionally or deliberately are us-
ing BIRC-like language as shorthand for one of the reformu-
lated justifications discussed in Part III, then my analysis of 
those justifications will show why that too is problematic. 
In this Part, I discuss six examples of cases where courts, 
legislatures, and legal scholars employ BIRC rhetoric to defend 
policies that influence when, whether, and with whom we re-
produce.60 In reviewing the use of BIRC-reasoning in my six il-
lustrations, I divide them into two categories for which the 
Non-Identity Problem has subtly different implications that I 
call ―perfect‖ and ―imperfect‖ Non-Identity Problems. I further 
develop the possible significance of this distinction in the next 
Part.  
A. PERFECT NON-IDENTITY PROBLEMS 
For ―perfect‖ Non-Identity Problems—for example, prohibi-
tions on incest or access to reproductive technologies—state ac-
tion restricting reproduction can never be justified by recourse 
to BIRC-reasoning because doing so is self-contradictory: the 
policy, if effective, will necessarily alter when, whether, and 
with whom one reproduces, thereby creating a Non-Identity 
Problem. Classification as a ―perfect Non-Identity Problem‖ is 
not dependent on the policy‘s aim to alter when, whether, and 
with whom we reproduce but instead what will happen if the 
policy is successful. Thus, a policy could have an aim entirely 
divorced from the purpose of altering individuals‘ reproductive 
choices, and yet, to the extent its success will have that effect, 
BIRC justifications for the intervention are problematic.  
 
 60. These examples are not exhaustive, but nicely cover both natural and 
artificial reproduction as well as different means of regulation. Other good ex-
amples might include the denial of reproductive technology access to the dis-
abled, see, Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17 (2002), and restric-
tions on procreation by incarcerated felons, see Carter Dillard, Child Welfare 
and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367, 391 (2009). 
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1. Criminal Prohibition of Adult Brother-Sister and First 
Cousin-First Cousin Incest  
Brother-sister incest between adults remains illegal in 
many states in the United States.61 Sex between first cousins is 
illegal in eight states, while marriage between them is illegal in 
twenty-five.62 The ―most commonly cited rationale for prohibit-
ing consensual relations is that incestuous relationships have 
the potential to create children with genetic problems if the 
parties reproduce,‖63 potentially a perfect illustration of BIRC 
justification.64 Courts in the United States have upheld these 
statutes on this basis, as has a recent case in England uphold-
ing a similar prohibition, even in cases where siblings adopted 
into different families subsequently married each other.65  
Sophisticated scholars have assumed the validity of BIRC 
arguments against incest. In a recent article examining the 
risk of ―incest‖ with sperm and egg donation in the U.S., Naomi 
Cahn argues that ―[t]he higher rate of genetic abnormalities in 
consanguineous relationships‖ provides ―a partial justification 
for the incest prohibition.‖66 In incestuous couplings there is an 
increased likelihood that both partners will carry the same re-
 
 61. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW, § 3-323 (LexisNexis 2002). Interestingly, brother-sister incest is not a 
crime in Rhode Island, Ohio, and New Jersey. Jennifer Collins et al., Punish-
ing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327, 1343 & n.83 (2008). 
 62. Collins et al., supra note 61, at 1344. While BIRC arguments as to 
parent-child incest also run afoul of the Non-Identity Problem, it seems to me 
that in these cases the justification for regulation is much more obviously con-
cerns about coercion in this relationship rather than BIRC. 
 63. Id. at 1391. 
 64. Of course, as I emphasize below, it is possible to recast these concerns 
not as BIRC but as non-person-affecting principle or externality justifications, 
although in context I read them more clearly as BIRC ones. 
 65. Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764–65 (Colo. 1978) (upholding a prohi-
bition on the marriage of adopted siblings while striking down a prohibition on 
marriage between adopted siblings reasoning that only as between genetically 
related siblings is ―[t]he physical detriment to the offspring of persons related 
by blood . . . totally absent‖) (quoting 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 183 
(1931)); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (relying on 
the prevention of the ―genetic mutation‖ of children born from incest as one of 
the reasons to uphold criminal prohibitions against constitutional challenge); 
State v. Allen M. (In re Tiffany Nicole M.), 571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1997) (similar); Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—or the Cur-
tain?—for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 61, 85–87 
(2009) (noting an English case and presenting genetic justifications for  
prohibition). 
 66. Cahn, supra note 65, at 86. 
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cessive gene, thus increasing the likelihood of genetic abnor-
malities from a two to three percent risk rate of severe abnor-
malities in non-consanguineous relationships to between thirty-
one and forty-four percent for siblings, with the most common 
abnormalities being congenital malformation, learning difficul-
ties, blindness, hearing impairment, metabolic disorders, cystic 
fibrosis, and hemoglobin disorders.67 Given that the ―risk of 
harm to future offspring is palpable and certain (although most 
such offspring will not experience these abnormalities),‖ Cahn 
concludes, ―we might decide it is appropriate, based on poten-
tial harm, to police certain relationships,‖ and she recommends 
―allow[ing] incestuous relationships [only] between relatives 
who are incapable of procreating, or . . . requir[ing] genetic test-
ing in the case of pregnancy.‖68 Many other scholars make simi-
lar arguments supporting the incest prohibitions.69  
To be sure, like Cahn, many of these authors critique exist-
ing laws as overinclusive in the scope of their prohibitions to be 
justified on the basis of the genetic harm argument. However, 
even if the prohibition was restricted to cases where there is a 
very substantial chance of genetic abnormalities, unless those 
abnormalities were severe enough to give the child a life not 
worth living, BIRC-type arguments in favor of the incest prohi-
bition are irrational: if the parents of a child born of incest had 
complied with the law and instead had other reproductive 
partners, a different child would come into existence.  
 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 85–87; Bernadette Modell & Aamra Darr, Genetic 
Counselling and Customary Consanguineous Marriage, 3 NATURE REVIEWS 
GENETICS 225 (2002). 
 68. Cahn, supra note 65, at 86–87 (emphasis added).  
 69. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope 
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary 
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2005) 
(noting that, while ―what could very well be deemed offensive, and thus legally 
prohibited, [about incest] is the fact that parents might put their future prog-
eny in harm‘s way by increasing the risk that they will be born with such [re-
cessive genetic] traits,‖ such a rationale is problematically underinclusive be-
cause we fail to criminalize other parents who do the same); Clare Chambers, 
Inclusivity and the Constitution of the Family, 22 CANADIAN. J.L. & JURI-
SPRUDENCE. 135, 144 (2009) (―[ I ]ncest is wrong to the extent that it harms 
non-consenting others and undermines the maintenance of society over time, 
in both cases by producing children with vulnerable genetic compositions.‖); 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 971, 998 (2006) (―As for consensual incest, even under [John 
Stuart] Mill‘s [Harm] principle it can justifiably be prohibited because it poses 
a significant risk of causing serious genetic harm to the children conceived 
thereby.‖). 
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2. Abstinence Education/Funding 
Since 1982, the U.S. government has spent over $1.5 bil-
lion to promote abstinence-only education programs through 
the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), the Maternal and Child 
Health Services Block Grant (Title V of the Social Security 
Act), and the Special Programs of Regional and National Signi-
ficance Community-Based Abstinence Education Program 
(CBAE).70 To qualify for funding under either Title V or the 
CBAE block grants, programs must meet a number of content 
requirements, including that the program mandates that the 
curriculum inter alia ―teaches that bearing children out-of-
wedlock is likely to have harmful consequences for the child,‖71 
a BIRC claim. In passing the CBAE statute, Congress relied in 
part on BIRC-type reasoning noting in its findings that the 
children of teenage mothers had ―a higher incidence of low 
birth weight babies‖ and higher infant morbidity.72 
BIRC justifications focused on social detriments expe-
rienced by the resulting children also feature prominently in 
conservative commentators‘ support for these kinds of pro-
grams, as reports issued by the Heritage Foundation demon-
strate. One such report authored by Patrick F. Fagan titled 
How Broken Families Rob Children of Their Chances for Future 
Prosperity proclaims that the children of ―teenage mothers who 
give birth outside of marriage . . . spend more time in poverty 
than do the children of any other family structure.‖73 The re-
port then catalogues a series of alleged harms to these children 
including that these children  
 
 70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to z-10 (2006); Social Security Act, Title V, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 710 (1935), amended by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Re-
conciliation Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 912 110 Stat. 2354 (1996); 
DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, COM-
MUNITY-BASED ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAM FUNDING OPPORTUNITY 
2008, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/grants/pdf/HHS-2008-ACF-ACYF-AE 
-0099.pdf; see Bonnie Scott Jones & Michelle Movahad, Lesson One: Your 
Gender is Your Destiny—The Constitutionality of Teaching Sex Stereotypes in 
Abstinence-Only Programs, AM. CONST. SOC‘Y FOR L. & POL‘Y, Sept. 2008, at 1, 
3, available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Jones_-_Movahed_Issue_ 
Brief.pdf.  
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2); Jones & Movahad, supra note 70, at 4. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (a)(5). 
 73. Patrick F. Fagan, How Broken Families Rob Children of Their 
Chances for Future Prosperity, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (The Herit-
age Found., D.C.), June 11, 1999, at 10–11, available at http://www 
.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1999/06/Broken-Families-Rob-Children-of-Their 
-Chances-for-Future-Prosperity.  
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miss more days of school, have lower educational aspirations, receive 
lower grades, and eventually divorce more often as adults . . . . [a]re 
almost twice as likely to exhibit antisocial behavior as adults; twenty-
five percent to fifty percent more likely to manifest such behavioral 
problems as anxiety, depression, hyperactivity, or dependence; two to 
three times more likely to need psychiatric care; and much more like-
ly to commit suicide as teenagers.74  
Because these programs explicitly attempt to alter when 
teenagers reproduce (after marriage or, after adolescence), such 
programs cannot be justified out of concern for the children who 
will result if teenagers do not wait; waiting means that those 
children never come into existence, instead other children do.  
3. Reproductive Technology Access Restrictions, Parental 
Fitness Screening, and the Adoption Analogy  
A number of countries restrict access to reproductive tech-
nologies on the basis of age, marital status, or sexual orienta-
tion and justify it through BIRC reasoning. Such arguments 
are incoherent based on a perfect Non-Identity Problem.  
Italy‘s Law 40 confines use of reproductive technologies to 
infertile women of ―potentially fertile age‖ who are married or 
part of a ―stable‖ heterosexual couple, and indirectly burdens 
LGBT Assistive Reproductive Technology (ART) users by pro-
hibiting the use of donated sperm or eggs.75 The BIRC-roots of 
the legislation are evident in the Italian Parliamentary Com-
mission for Social Affairs‘ review of the then-proposed legisla-
tion expressing concern with ―avoiding psycho-social damage to 
the child, which can result from parenting models which are 
not socially consolidated.‖76 a view also espoused by more re-
cent Italian governments.77 The Australian states of Western 
 
 74. Id. at 11; see also, e.g., Robert E. Rector et al., Marriage: Still the Safest 
Place For Women and Children, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (The Herit-
age Found., D.C.) Mar. 9, 2004 (claiming that children of divorce or never-
married mothers are far more ―likely to suffer from child abuse than are children 
raised by both biological parents in marriage‖), available at http://www.heritage 
.org/research/reports/2004/03/marriage-still-the-safest-place-for-women-and-
children. 
 75. See Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women‟s Rights: 
The New Italian Law On Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 73, 
(2006). 
 76. Id. at 88. Article I of the law itself provides the act‘s guiding principle: 
―recourse to medically assisted reproduction is permitted only in conformity 
with this statute and the rights of all those involved, including those of the 
concepito, or unborn child, are said to be ensured.‖ Id. at 83. 
 77. Id. at 83, 88, 89 (citing recent Department of Health Consultation Pa-
per proclaiming that ―[a]s a general rule the Government believes that it is 
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Australia, South Australia and Victoria have all enacted simi-
lar legislation forbidding access to ART by LGBT and single in-
dividuals and permitting use only where the reason for infertil-
ity is not age; the statutes explicitly adopt BIRC language.78 
The Western Australian version requires ―that the prospective 
welfare of any child to be born consequent upon a procedure to 
which this Act relates is properly taken into consideration.‖79  
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act (HFEA) of 1990 specifies that ―a woman shall not 
be provided with treatment services unless account has been 
taken of the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of 
the treatment (including the need of that child for a father).‖80 
The HFEA Act of 2008 recently liberalized that policy by sub-
stituting ―supportive parenting‖ for ―a father‖ in the parenthet-
ical after legislators decided that the requirement discrimi-
nated against single mothers and lesbians;81 however, the 
―duty . . . to consider the welfare of any child who may be born 
as a result of the treatment . . . , and of any other child who 
may be affected‖ has been retained.82 France‘s 1994 law regu-
lating reproductive technologies confines ART access to ―hete-
rosexual couples who . . . are married or have lived together for 
at least two years prior to the reproductive procedure‖ and are 
of child bearing age; the BIRC justification for this law has be-
come still more prominent in recent debates as to whether to 
include a right to use ART for couples entering into a Pacte Ci-
vile de Stabilité or PaCS (roughly ―Pact of Civil Solidarity‖), 
 
better for a child to have both a father and a mother‖); see ROSARIO M. ISASI & 
BARTHA M. KNOPPERS, NATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS REGARDING 
HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE GENETIC TESTING 7 (2006), available at http://www 
.dnapolicy.org/pdf/geneticTesting.pdf. 
 78. See Infertility Treatment Act 1995, (Vict.) s 8 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/ita1995264.pdf; Human Repro-
ductive Technology Act 1991, (W. Austl.) ss 4, 23(c), available at http://www 
.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/hrta1991331/s4.html (section 4), http:// 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/hrta1991331/s23.html (section 23); 
Reproductive Technology Act 1988, (S. Austl.) ss 10(b), 13(3)(b), available at 
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/ASSISTED%20REPRODUCTIVE%20T
REATMENT%20ACT%201988/2000.07.05_%281996.08.01%29/1988.10.PDF. 
 79. Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991, (W. Austl.) ss 4, 23(c).  
 80. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 13(5) (Eng.). 
 81. See Aidan Jones, Rules Eased for Second Parent in IVF Births, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/02/law-family. 
 82. Compare Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 14(2) 
(Eng.) with Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 13(5) (Eng.). 
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open to heterosexual or homosexual couples.83 Iceland‘s Act no. 
55/1996 provides that ―Artificial fertilisation may only be car-
ried out if . . . the child to be conceived by the procedure may be 
deemed to be ensured good conditions in which to grow up.‖84 
Other countries, such as Greece and Japan, also restrict access 
to ARTs to women fifty-years-old or younger.85  
In the United States, no state currently bans ART use by 
aged, single, or LGBT individuals, but several bills have been 
introduced in state legislatures to do so.86 Instead, access de-
 
 83. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology And 
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1474 (2008); Patrick Ro-
ger, Blocage Sur L‟adoption Par Les Couples Homosexuels [Ban on Adoption by 
Homosexual Couples], LE MONDE (Fr.), Jan. 27, 2006, at 21, available at 
http://www.apgl.fr/presse/lemonde20060126-2.pdf; see M. JEAN LEONETTI, LA 
COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LA LÉGISLATION ET DE 
L‘ADMINISTRATION GÉNÉRALE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE SUR LA PROPOSITION DE 
LOI [COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LEGISLATION, AND GENERAL AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC], RAPPORT (N° 2211), RELATIVE À 
L‘ORGANISATION DU DEBAT PUBLIC SUR LES PROBLEMES ÉTHIQUES ET LES 
QUESTIONS DE SOCIETE [REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC DEBATE OVER 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIETAL QUESTIONS], Feb. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rapports/r2276.asp#P122_15516; Loi Bio-
éthique: Les Principales Propositions du Rapport Leonetti [Bioethics Law: The 
Main Proposals of Leonetti‟s Report], TFI NEWS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://lci.tf1 
.fr/science/sante/2010-01/loi-bioethique-les-principales-propositions-du-rapport 
-leonetti-5644995.html. 
 84. ACT NO. 55/1996 ON ARTIFICIAL IMPREGNATION AND THE USE OF HU-
MAN SEX CELLS AND EMBRYOS FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH (ICELAND 1996), 
available at http://www.althingi.is/dba-bin/unds.pl?txti=/wwwtext/html/lagasofn/ 
138b/1996055.html&leito=t%E6knifrj%F3vgun#word1 (translation courtesy of 
Sigridur Rut Juliusdottir). 
 85. Nomos (2002:3089) [Medically Assisted Human Reproduction], Official 
Gazette of the Helenic Republic 2002, 1:1455 (Greece); Fenton, supra note 75, 
at 84 (reviewing Italy‘s law 40); Rachel Brehm King, Redefining Motherhood: 
Discrimination in Legal Parenthood in Japan, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL‘Y J. 189, 
215 (2009) (explaining that Japan‘s Assisted Reproductive Technology Com-
mittee recommends ART be limited to women under 50); Rao, supra note 83 
(discussing Italy‘s Law 40 limiting use of ART to women ―of childbearing age‖). 
 86. At the present moment, these bills do not seem to be moving forward. 
See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Bar-
riers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 44–46 (2008) 
(citing H.B. 187, 2006 Reg. Sess. of the Va. Gen. Ass.; Mary Beth Schneider, 
Assisted Reproduction Bill Dropped, IND. STAR, Oct. 6, 2005, at 2B). Various 
U.S. states achieve similar ends through more subtle means such as limiting 
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements to cases where the commissioning 
couple is legally married, limiting insurance mandates covering IVF to cases of 
married heterosexual individuals, and absolving sperm donors of legal parent-
hood responsibilities only when the recipient is married. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 742.15(1) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (West 2008); JES-
SICA ARONS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND 
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nials stem from policies adopted by industry groups and atti-
tudes of individual physicians often premised on BIRC justifi-
cations. For example, the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) put forth a 1997 statement on access to ART 
for older women suggesting that ―postmenopausal pregnancy 
should be discouraged,‖ and that physicians should carefully 
consider not only threats to the woman‘s health or that of the 
child, but also ―the provision for child-rearing.‖87 It explained 
that ―[b]ecause parenting is both an emotionally stressful and 
physically demanding experience, older women and their part-
ners may be unable to meet the needs of a growing child and 
maintain a long parental relationship,‖ and ―children could re-
sent having mothers old enough to be grandmothers and be ad-
versely affected psychologically and socially.‖88 Similarly, the 
American College of Pediatricians‘ 2004 position statement ad-
vises that ―[g]iven the current body of research . . . it is inap-
propriate, potentially hazardous to children, and dangerously 
irresponsible to change the age-old prohibition on homosexual 
parenting, whether by adoption, foster care, or by reproductive 
manipulation.‖89 In most states such service denials by provid-
ers remain lawful.90  
These and other BIRC concerns have been internalized by 
U.S. physicians: A recent study found that one-fifth of U.S. 
ART treatment providers would refuse to provide services to a 
woman without a partner, 48% were ―[v]ery or extremely likely 
to turn away‖ a gay couple using surrogates with one man as 
sperm donor, and 17% were likely to turn away a lesbian couple 
seeking to achieve pregnancy with donor insemination.91 Many 
of these practitioners acknowledged a BIRC motivation for 
their gate-keeping with 62% and 64% agreeing with the state-
 
THE LAW 8 (2007); Cohen & Chen, supra note 14, at 539; Daar, supra, at 46; 
John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 356 (2004). 
 87. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc‘y for Reprod. Med., Oocyte Donation to 
Postmenopausal Women, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S254, S255 (2004). 
 88. Id. at S254–55 (2004).  
 89. Press Release, Am. Coll. of Pediatricians, Homosexual Parenting: Is it 
Time For Change? (Mar. 22, 2009), available at http://www.acpeds.org/ 
Homosexual-Parenting-Is-it-Time-for-Change-Press-Release.html. 
 90. But see N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Superior 
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 970 (Cal. 2008) (holding that a service denial based on 
sexual orientation violated California‘s Unruh Civil Rights Act and was not 
protected on First Amendment Free Exercise grounds). 
 91. Gurmankin et al., supra note 3, at 61–65.  
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ments ―[i]t is wrong for me to help bring a child into the world 
to be cared for by a parent who would be unfit in some way‖ 
and ―I have the responsibility to consider a parent‘s fitness be-
fore helping them conceive a child,‖ respectively.92 
Scholars, while taking opposite positions on the underlying 
data, have treated BIRC as the appropriate idiom in which to 
debate these questions. In asking whether age-based restric-
tions on IVF pass constitutional muster, Radhika Rao suggests 
that ―[a]ge limits should be considered constitutional as long as 
they . . . promote a valid objective, such as ensuring that the 
children born of such technologies will have parents who are 
alive and able to care for them.‖93 More generally, Rao posits 
that ―prohibition upon the use of ARTs is [constitutionally] 
permissible as long as it is based upon a legitimate interest 
that goes beyond mere prejudice,‖ and that ―[t]he government 
could limit the use of ARTs in order to prevent physical, psy-
chological, or social harms to the participants or the resulting 
children‖ as it does in adoption and that deficits to a child in 
being raised in a single or LGBT household could constitute 
such harm (although she doubts the claim‘s empirical sup-
port).94 In a similar vein, Naomi Cahn treats BIRC as the ap-
propriate subject of inquiry, but nevertheless notes the lack of 
strong empirical evidence that children of heterosexual couples 
do better than those of gays or lesbians.95 While opposing 
sperm donor anonymity and unmarried and LGBT use of ARTs, 
Lynn Wardle also explicitly ties the issue to best interests ar-
guments employed in family law as to already existing children 
by claiming that ―[d]epriving a child of contact with one of his 
or her parents is very harmful to children‖ and pointing inter 
alia to laws ―designed to encourage, protect, and facilitate visi-
tation, even if the parents do not get along with each other‖96 
He concludes that U.S. laws are problematically ―schizophren-
ic‖ in that while ―we go to great lengths to protect the child‘s 
right to a filial relationship with both parents in all other con-
 
 92. Id. at 64. 
 93. Rao, supra note 83, at 1477. 
 94. Id. at 1476–77, 1479 (emphasis added). 
 95. NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET 
NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 167–70 (2009). 
 96. Lynn Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by As-
sisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 444, 446 (2006). 
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ceivable circumstances, we simply ignore that right and that 
need of children in the ART context.‖97  
The same theme appears in calls by leading scholars to re-
quire parental fitness screening for reproductive technology 
access patterned on adoption. Debora Spar, now Dean of Co-
lumbia University‘s Barnard College, emblemizes this approach 
to the problem arguing that 
 [i]n the field of adoption, the interests and rights of the child are al-
ways taken as paramount: no would-be parent in the United States 
can legally adopt a child without some outside authority (a child wel-
fare office, licensed adoption agency, or court) deeming that the par-
ent is fit and that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the 
child.98 
She continues by noting that this ―underlying prin-
ciple . . . could easily be extended into the realm of assisted re-
production, even if only to scrutinize procedures that are 
known to carry extensive risks to the child . . . .‖99 Similarly, 
Marsha Garrison has argued that ―[l]ogically, if regulation of 
adoption is constitutionally permissible to safeguard the inter-
ests of the adoptive child, her biological parents, and would-be 
adoptive parents, so is regulation of reproductive technology 
aimed at protecting the various actors involved and any child-
ren that might be produced.‖100 Furthermore, she argues that 
―[t]o the extent that ART—or obstetrical practice—imposes 
risks on future children equivalent to those that state and fed-
eral law disallow for actual children, there is a sound basis for 
regulation aimed at providing protection against such hazards‖ 
that is justified by ―child-protection aims.‖101 Others make simi-
lar claims.102 
 
 97. Id. at 451; see also Camille S. Williams, Planned Parent-Deprivation: 
Not in the Best Interests of the Child, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 375, 
376, 389 (2005) (lamenting that ―given the importance of shared familial his-
tory and kinship to individual identity, and the importance of both maternal 
and paternal involvement in the development of children, intentionally depriv-
ing a child of one parent will surely wound the child in a multitude of ways‖ 
and that current reproductive technology research and policy are ―about the 
individual or couple and not necessarily about the best interests of the child.‖). 
 98. Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring The Limits of Parental 
Choice in Assisted Reproduction, 27 LAW & INEQ. 481, 491 (2009). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1623, 1627 (2008). 
 101. Id. at 1642; see also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: 
An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 835, 858 (2000) (―Our tradition of deference to individual decisions 
about coital procreation and parenting undeniably supports equivalent def-
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Several countries have adopted this exact model and tried 
to make their reproductive technology access rules more like 
their regulation of adoption.103 Victoria, Australia requires 
criminal background checks as precondition for IVF usage.104 
The Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynecology advises 
screening out those who exhibit psychopathologies.105 The 
ASRM recommends developing written policies regarding 
screening out those with uncontrolled psychiatric illness, a his-
tory of child or spousal abuse, or drug abuse.106 At the level of 
clinical practice, a 2001 survey of 324 ART clinics in the United 
States found that the majority of respondents would deny 
access to services to parents who engaged in ―excessive‖ alcohol 
consumption, marijuana use, or were convicted of child abuse; 
some clinics suggested they would deny access based on paren-
 
erence to individual choice in the use of technological conception. But defe-
rence does not imply abdication of any regulatory role. Indeed, parents who 
want to adopt, the ‗traditional‘ method of achieving parenthood non-coitally, 
face a maze of state regulations, including rules imposing waiting periods be-
fore an adoption is finalized, voiding parental consents obtained prenatally, 
permitting rescission of parental consent within stated time limits, and requir-
ing adopting through an intermediary agency.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 102. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS 33 (1993); Usha 
Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Sur-
rogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 83–84 
(2008–09) (proposing that U.S. patients seeking to use surrogates living 
abroad could be regulated in a way similar to international adoption, including 
―requiring a home study of the commissioning parties, including criminal 
background checks‖; however, concluding that international surrogacy should 
be abolished rather than regulated); Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 
184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591, 596 (2001) (observing that ―[i]t 
should not be surprising that ART clinics feel responsibility to limit access in 
certain cases‖ because ―concern for the well-being of children has long been a 
defining factor of the adoption process‖). 
 103. See Stern, supra note 102; Storrow, supra note 18, at 2290–91; see also 
Daar, supra note 86, at 67 (―Basing a physician‘s ability to deny ART services 
on his or her prediction about the child-rearing abilities of a prospective par-
ent is speculative and leaves too much opportunity for masking pure discrimi-
nation with concern for offspring.‖). 
 104. Mixed Response to Victoria‟s IVF Law Changes, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5, 
2008, 5:44 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-12-05/mixed-response-to 
-victorias-ivf-law-changes/230976. 
 105. M. Hunfeld et al., Protect the Child from Being Born: Arguments 
Against IVF from Heads of the 13 Licensed Dutch Fertility Centres, Ethical 
and Legal Perspectives, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 279, 280 (2004). 
 106. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc‘y for Reprod. Med., Child-Rearing Abili-
ty and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564, 565 
(2004). 
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tal schizophrenia, mental impairment, or suspected child 
abuse.107  
The Non-Identity problem renders the empirical evidence 
about child outcomes irrelevant in BIRC arguments towards 
justifying the age, marital status, sexuality, or other parental 
fitness restrictions explored by John Robertson and Judith 
Daar.108 There is a key problem with the analogy between par-
ental fitness screening for adoption versus reproduction: a par-
ticular child waiting to be adopted can be harmed if the child is 
placed with unfit parents instead of other parents or continuing 
in foster care, etc., although that depends on what life in foster 
care would look like. By contrast, if potential genetic parents 
are unfit, a particular child that would result cannot be harmed 
if gate keeping rules them out because that particular child 
would not otherwise come into existence.109  
Because policies that alter when individuals reproduce also 
create perfect Non-Identity Problems, home study visits and 
background checks may be problematic even if the parents 
pass, since to the extent they delay the moment sperm meets 
egg they are not in the best interests of a particular resulting 
child because the delay has caused a different child to result.  
B. IMPERFECT NON-IDENTITY PROBLEMS 
While perfect Non-Identity Problems are the easiest to see, 
a second category of ―imperfect Non-Identity Problems,‖ for ex-
ample interventions aimed at prohibiting sperm donor anonym-
ity, arise where state action will not necessarily alter when, 
whether, and with whom the whole population affected by the 
intervention reproduces. As will become clearer as I work 
through examples of these below, while perfect Non-Identity 
 
 107. Gurmankin et al., supra note 3, at 61–65. 
 108. See Daar, supra note 86, at 69–71; Robertson, supra note 86, at 341, 
343, 347; Robertson, supra note 32, at 29–31. 
 109. On its face, there is no Non-Identity Problem with removing the child, 
once born, from the custody of his rearing parents in favor of his being reared 
by another set of parents, and justifying it on the basis of Best Interests of the 
Existing Child-type reasoning. But suppose there is a rule to this effect up-
front, for example that women over age 50 who successfully reproduce will 
have their resulting children removed from their custody and legal parentage 
and given to other parents. It is likely that few (if any) parents would choose 
to conceive in this circumstance, thereby manufacturing an imperfect Non-
Identity problem without regulating reproduction per se. It seems that this 
move, too, could not be justified based on best interests grounds for that rea-
son. See infra text accompanying notes 167–70. 
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Problems make BIRC-type justifications for policies nonsensic-
al; imperfect Non-Identity Problems will sharply reduce the 
probability/number of children for whom the BIRC-type reason-
ing can be invoked in favor of a given intervention.110 To use an 
example I will discuss in greater depth, for sperm donation it is 
theoretically possible that in a world where donor anonymity 
was prohibited there may exist at least one child who will come 
into existence with the same genetic code (i.e., when, whether, 
and with whom its genetic parents reproduce will be unal-
tered), but the probability/number of children for whom that 
will be true is likely very small (since all three conditions must 
go unaltered). 
Diagram 1 
 
 
The idea is illustrated by Diagram 1: The perfect Non-
Identity Problem is a fixed point at the end of the continuum 
where no member of the class of resulting children on whose 
 
 110. To be more precise, it will alter the probability that a set number of 
individuals, on whose behalf the intervention is urged, will be harmed.  
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behalf the intervention is urged can be said to be harmed, for if 
the intervention succeeds none of those children would come in-
to existence, rather other children (or no other children) would 
exist. By contrast, we can think of imperfect Non-Identity Prob-
lems as a sliding scale filling up the middle of the continuum, 
where the larger the number of children who will come into ex-
istence with the same genetic code (i.e., whose parents‘ decision 
whether, when, and with whom to reproduce will be the same) 
whether or not the intervention is in place, the more imperfect 
the Non-Identity Problem will be, and thus the larger the num-
ber of children for whom BIRC arguments will actually be va-
lid. At the other end of the continuum are cases where no Non-
Identity Problem will result because the intervention will not 
alter whether, when, and with whom anyone reproduces.  
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Diagram 2 
Diagram 2 illustrates this point a second way, by showing 
the ―imperfect‖ nature of a Non-Identity Problem as a question 
of the degree of overlap between two populations—the popula-
tion of children who will come into existence if the intervention 
is not in place (on the left) and the population of children who 
will come into existence if the intervention is in place (on the 
right). The zone where the two circles overlap represents the 
sub-population of children who will come into existence with 
the same genetic code (i.e., when, whether, and with whom re-
production occurs is the same) whether or not the intervention 
is in place. As the BIRC-type argument becomes more imper-
fect, the zone of intersection between the two circles increases, 
meaning that the probability/number of children who will come 
into existence with the same genetic code whether or not the 
intervention is in place increases. There is no Non-Identity 
Problem regarding the population of children falling into this 
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zone of intersection. We can actually say they are harmed since 
their counterfactual is not nonexistence but existence with ver-
sus without the intervention in place, assuming arguendo the 
intervention prevents harm to them.111 
This description helps clarify that the examples that inter-
est me share two features. First, the governmental intervention 
is urged on the basis of BIRC-type reasoning. While many  
governmental interventions may have the alteration of when, 
whether, and with whom we reproduce as a side effect, it is on-
ly those that are justified by BIRC reasoning that the Non-
Identity Problem renders problematic. For example, a state‘s 
decision to shut down a public university or even increase its 
tuition may alter when, whether, and with whom individuals 
reproduce if many people meet their future husband or wife in 
university. There is no Non-Identity Problem with that inter-
vention, though, because closure or tuition hikes are not being 
justified on the basis of the interests of the children who will 
result.112 Second, for all my examples, even if not giving rise to 
a perfect Non-Identity Problem, the Non-Identity Problem is 
fairly close to the perfect end of the continuum and closer to 
that end than the no Non-Identity Problem end. I explore the 
implications of this latter point in more depth in Part III. Here 
I set out three examples of imperfect Non-Identity Problems. 
1. Sperm Donor Anonymity 
In 1985, Sweden became the first country to prohibit ano-
nymous sperm ‗donation‘113 by requiring that donor-conceived 
 
 111. This diagram is slightly misleading in that the circles stay the same 
size throughout, when in fact the size of the circles representing the number of 
children born will likely change given most of these interventions. This is 
clearest to see in interventions that affect whether given individuals will re-
produce, where the intervention, if it succeeds, reduces the number of child-
ren. This idea has important implications for non-person-affecting principles 
discussed in Part III, but for the purposes of a diagram I favored simplicity.  
 112. There are some related (but more complex) problems with legislation 
to try and ―save‖ the environment that may change who makes up the future 
generation whose interests we are trying to serve. See PARFIT, supra note 32, 
at 371–77 (describing the impact of choices on future events in the environ-
mental context). I put environmental cases to one side in this Article except for 
one tentative suggestion at supra note 38.  
 113. The term ―donor‖ is actually a misnomer since most provision of sperm 
is for compensation; still, I will rely on the more familiar terms ―donor‖ and 
―donation‖ rather than ―provider‖ and ―provision‖ but ask the reader to keep 
this caveat in mind. Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodifica-
tion in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous 
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children be able to receive identifying information about their 
sperm donor when ―sufficiently mature.‖114 The law stemmed 
from studies of the welfare of adopted children, which the 
Swedes extrapolated to donor-conceived children.115 A number 
of jurisdictions followed suit including Austria, Germany, Swit-
zerland, the Australian States of Victoria and Western Austral-
ia, the Netherlands, and Norway.116 Most recently the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand adopted similar policies in 2004, in 
both cases justifying that approach on BIRC grounds.117  
Leading scholars have also treated the potential harm to 
resulting children from donor anonymity as the right lens to 
consider whether the United States should adopt similar prohi-
bitions. For example, Naomi Cahn writes that ―[a] law that re-
quired parents to tell their children of their donor origins and 
that permitted children to contact their donors could be justi-
fied on a showing that, without this information, children expe-
rience grave psychological, social, mental, and emotional diffi-
culties.‖ But she claims that ―[t]hese data do not, however, 
exist‖ and that ―[c]hildren born through the new technologies 
appear to be as well adjusted as other children.‖118 Similarly, 
 
Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 257, 258–59 
(2002). 
 114. Claes Gottlieb et al., Disclosure of Donor Insemination to the Child: 
The Impact of Swedish Legislation on Couples‟ Attitudes, 15 HUM. REPROD. 
2052, 2052 (2000). 
 115. Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-
Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8 (2008) (citing Gottlieb, 
supra note 114). 
 116. Dennison, supra note 115, at 8–9; Ilke Turkmendag et al., The Re-
moval of Donor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-Be 
Parents, 22 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 283, 283–84 (2008). 
 117. Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, § 4 (a), (e) (N.Z.) 
(―[T]he health and well-being of children born as a result of the performance of 
an assisted reproductive procedure . . . should be an important consideration 
in all decisions about that procedure,‖ and more specifically, that ―donor 
offspring should be made aware of their genetic origins and be able to access 
information about those origins‖); Ken Daniels & Alison Douglass, Access to 
Genetic Information by Donor Offspring and Donors: Medicine, Policy and Law 
In New Zealand, 27 MED. & L. 131, 137 (2008) (noting how the New Zealand 
law reflects a principle that ―knowledge by donor-offspring of their genetic ori-
gins is central to the health and well-being of children born as a result of as-
sisted reproductive procedure‖); see also Christopher De Jonge & Christopher 
L. R. Barratt, Gamete Donation: A Question of Anonymity, 85 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 500 (2006); Dennison, supra note 115115, at 9–10; Can You Be 
Anonymous as a Sperm, Egg or Embryo Donor? HUM. FERTILISATION & EM-
BRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1973.html. 
 118. CAHN, supra note 95, at 126.  
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Ellen Waldman treats the issues of openness in adoption and 
sperm donation as equivalent, both hinging on a best interests 
analysis, but while she finds the empirical evidence of harm to 
children from closed adoption compelling, she concludes that 
―[t]he data pushes for openness, but only modestly‖119 regard-
ing reproductive technologies.120 Other scholars have made 
similar BIRC-type evaluations.121 
Explaining the problem with the BIRC justification here is 
a bit more complex. Prohibitions on sperm donor anonymity 
tend to alter whether and with whom individuals reproduce. 
Such regulation may cause some would-be donors not to do-
nate, altering whether and with whom they reproduce. Further, 
regimes that prohibit anonymity usually ceteris paribus reduce 
the number of sperm donors, as has been the experience in 
Sweden, the Australian state of Victoria, England, New Zeal-
and, and the Netherlands when they eliminated donor anonym-
ity.122 If donor anonymity were to actually produce a true ga-
mete shortage, then, as to some portion of the population 
seeking donors, we would end up with a de facto restriction on 
whether they reproduce, creating a Non-Identity Problem in a 
 
 119. Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 
517, 544 (2006). 
 120. Id. at 524, 532, 536, 544 (2006). 
 121. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and The Construction of 
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 682–88 (2008) (arguing that ―most people 
agree that we must consider children‘s interests in any question about parent-
hood,‖ while conceding that data bears on whether donor anonymity for ga-
mete donation should be permitted ―is far from definitive‖); Dennison, supra 
note 115, at 17 (concluding that ―a number of studies that have been con-
ducted have reached the same conclusion as those that have studied adoptees: 
namely, that for their own well-being, donor-conceived children need to know 
about their background‖); Julie L. Sauer, Competing Interests and Gamete Do-
nation: The Case for Anonymity, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 939–43 (2009); 
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification In Assisted Procr-
eation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human 
Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 257, 268 (2002) (―From the perspective 
of the child, and the person that child will become, knowledge of how and from 
whom one came to be is now being seen as part of the right to an identity.‖); 
Wardle, supra note 96, at 444–51. 
 122. See, e.g., June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regula-
tion, and Trust: Building Ethical Understandings Into the Market for Fertility 
Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 540 (2006); Waldman, supra note 
119, at 549–57 (discussing and collecting studies). For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the disastrous effects of anonymity prohibitions on the sperm supply 
in Sweden, the U.K., and the Australian state of Victoria, see Gaia Bernstein, 
Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Ano-
nymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189, 1207–18 (2010). 
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way similar to access restrictions. Even if this regulation re-
sults only in waiting lists (as has been the case in many coun-
tries),123 that may also de facto limit whether individuals re-
produce, because some women seeking sperm donation will be 
at the end of their fertility cycle and often multiple attempts 
are required to successfully inseminate.124 
To deal with such shortages many countries adopt mechan-
isms aimed at recruiting new sperm donors, thereby altering 
with whom individuals reproduce. ―In Sweden, recruitment ef-
forts have focused increasingly on the older, more altruistically 
motivated donor as a way of rebounding from the initial dam-
pening effects of the‖ prohibition on donor anonymity.125 The 
Australian state of Victoria has also tried to deal with low do-
nor supply by targeting this population,126 and one clinic in 
New South Wales, Australia even flew Canadian students to 
Australia for complimentary ‗vacations‘ that required sperm 
donations every second day.127  
Furthermore, even if the same donors are involved under 
the new and old regime, when they donate, and thus when re-
production takes place, may change dramatically. For example, 
I may choose to donate at age 40 rather than age 20 because I 
am concerned about donor anonymity before I am married and 
have children,128 or it could change slightly if I choose to donate 
tomorrow rather than today because of the public relations 
campaign used to get me to donate in the anonymity-prohibited 
world. Both would be sufficient to produce a Non-Identity Prob-
lem. It is also conceivable that anonymity prohibitions will 
 
 123. See Bernstein, supra note 122. 
 124. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine estimates that with 
artificial insemination ―the monthly chance of pregnancy ranges from 8% to 
15%.‖ AM. SOC‘Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE 
FOR PATIENTS 12 (2006), available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_ 
Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/thirdparty 
.pdf. 
 125. Waldman, supra note 119, at 552 (citing A. Lalos et al., Recruitment 
and Motivation of Semen Providers in Sweden, 18 HUM. REPROD. 212 (2003)).  
 126. Id. at 553 (explaining clinics in Victoria, Australia, targeted older, al-
truistically motived donors by using public relations campaigns).  
 127. Id.  
 128. Cf. Ken R. Daniels et al., Information Sharing in Semen Donation: 
The Views of Donors, 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 673, 680 (1997) (suggesting that while 
young students who donate for financial gain—a typical pool of sperm do-
nors—often become unwilling to donate when anonymity is removed, older and 
married men who already have children are less phased by prohibitions on 
anonymity and could be tapped as a potential new donor pool). 
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change the timing of insemination on the recipient side, for ex-
ample, if shortages produce wait-lists or other forms of queuing 
for access.  
In any event, so long as a different sperm meets a different 
egg due to the anonymity prohibition rule, it cannot be better 
for the child who would have existed in the anonymity regime, 
as that child will never exist. All of this readily distinguishes 
the situation here from the adoption context, where the enact-
ment of openness laws (it is argued) improves the welfare of ex-
isting children129 but does not affect whether those children 
come into existence. 
To be sure, there may exist at least one child who would 
have come into existence in both the anonymity-permitted and 
anonymity-prohibited regimes—one child conceived when the 
same donated sperm meets the same egg and for whom the rule 
has no effect on whether, when, and with whom reproduction 
takes place. As to that particular potential child (or children) a 
BIRC justification will be valid, which is why the Non-Identity 
Problem is imperfect. But the sheer number of children for 
whom this will be true is much smaller than the universe of all 
donor-conceived children to which the arguments debated by 
Cahn,130 Waldman,131 and others are meant to apply. I further 
discuss this question of whether the probability and numbers 
affected matter in the next Part. 
What if individuals circumvent the law, for example if a 
firm offers a black market in anonymous sperm donation? The 
pool of donors and recipients, or the occasion in which donation 
takes places, is still likely to change—once again creating a 
Non-Identity Problem. But even if for a sub-set of the popula-
tion use of a black market would not alter when, whether, or 
with whom they reproduced, such that as to them the Non-
Identity Problem is avoided, that can hardly be an argument 
for adopting this legal intervention. If the only justified in-
stances of a law are when the law is broken, the law should not 
be one we should enact. The same is true for cases where the 
law merely fails to have its desired effect, for example, absti-
nence education programs that do not produce much  
abstinence. 
 
 129. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 119, at 520–28 (discussing several stu-
dies and arguments debating the benefits of open adoption). 
 130. See Cahn, supra note 65. 
 131. See Waldman, supra note 119. 
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2. Sperm and Egg ‗Donor‘ and Surrogate Compensation 
Surrogacy, egg donation, and sperm donation are some-
times attacked on the claim that the resulting children are 
harmed because of donor or surrogate compensation. Many 
countries have restricted surrogacy. Britain, Canada and the 
Australian states of Victoria and New South Wales have 
banned or limited compensation for egg and sperm donation 
beyond expenses incurred.132 Canada, the Australian states of 
Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia have also 
made commercial surrogacy a crime,133 as have the U.S. states 
of New York, Michigan, and Washington, and the District of 
Columbia.134 Great Britain de facto prohibits commercial sur-
rogacy by forbidding the transfer of parentage rights from the 
surrogate to the intended parents absent ―a showing before the 
court that the surrogate received no financial or other benefi-
cial consideration in exchange for her services as a surro-
gate.‖135 The U.S. states of Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, 
New Mexico and Oregon render commercial surrogacy con-
tracts unenforceable.136  
The rationales behind these laws tend to be somewhat 
opaque from the legislative histories, but the judicial and scho-
larly literature is a bit clearer. Although much of the literature 
 
 132. See Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002, No. 144, s 23 (Austl.); As-
sisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c .2, S7(1) (Can.); Press Release, 
Human Fertilization & Embryology Auth., HFEA Confirms UK Position on 
Payment for Egg Donors (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/ 
784.html; Human Fertilization & Embryology Auth., Sperm, Egg and Embryo 
Donation (SEED) Report, 14 (2005), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/SEEDReport05 
.pdf; see also Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, 
Ethics, and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women‟s 
Rights, 29 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 193, 204–06 (2008). 
 133. Surrogacy Bill 2010 (N.S.W.), pt 2 div 2 s 8 (Austl.); Surrogacy Act 
2008 (W. Austl.), pt 2 div 2 ss 8–9 (Austl.); Infertility Treatment Act 1995 
(Vict.), pt 6 s 59 (Austl.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, 
§ 6(1) (Can.); see Ailis L. Burpee, Note, Momma Drama: A Study of How Can-
ada‟s National Regulation of Surrogacy Compares to Australia‟s Independent 
State Regulation of Surrogacy, 37 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 305, 310–20 (2009). 
 134. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401 to 16-402 (LexisNexis 2001) (punishing 
both commercial and altruistic surrogacy); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 
(West 2002); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 2010); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210–.260 (West 2005). 
 135. Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial 
Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 275, 286 (2009). 
 136. See generally Darra L. Hofman, ―Mama‟s Baby, Daddy‟s Maybe:” A 
State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449 (2009) (50 state survey).  
 2011] REGULATING REPRODUCTION 467 
 
on prohibiting (or limiting) compensation for egg (and much 
less frequently sperm) ―donation‖ focuses on what I have else-
where termed ―coercion‖ concerns about the voluntariness of 
the decision to participate due to monetary inducement, a form 
of Legal Paternalism justification in Part I‘s taxonomy—and 
anticommodificationist corruption,137 compensation has also 
been challenged due to its harmful effects on the children who 
result.  
Kenneth Baum, for example, considers whether ―a market 
in oocytes could have adverse psychological effects on the resul-
tant offspring.‖138 While he rejects the empirical bona fides of 
the claim, he accepts the question‘s validity.139 In a famous ar-
ticle, the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson argues that commer-
cial surrogacy is unethical because it poses harms to both the 
surrogate and the resulting child, suggesting that ―no one 
represents the child‘s interests in the surrogate industry‖ and 
that commercial surrogacy‘s ―substitutions of market norms for 
parental norms represent ways of treating children as commod-
ities which are degrading to them.‖140 She asks rhetorically: 
―[w]ould it be any wonder if a child born of a surrogacy agree-
ment feared resale by parents who have such an attitude‖ and 
if ―a child who knew how anxious her parents were that she 
have the ‗right‘ genetic makeup might fear that her parent‘s 
love was contingent upon her expression of these characteris-
tics[?]‖141 Martha Ertman similarly wonders whether ―purchas-
ing gametes to conceive a child could cause the child to feel that 
he or she has been purchased like a new car‖ and notes Peggy 
Radin‘s claim that ―conceiving of any child in market rhetoric 
harms personhood.‖142 
 
 137. I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: 
Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–90 
(2003). 
 138. Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oo-
cyte Donation, BYU L. REV. 107, 156 (2001). 
 139. See id. at 157. 
 140. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women‟s Labor a Commodity, 19 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 71, 75–77 (1990). 
 141. Id. at 77.  
 142. Martha M. Ertman, What‟s Wrong With a Parenthood Market?: A New 
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2003) 
(quoting MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH 
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 139 (1996)). 
While, unlike Anderson, Ertman is ultimately unconvinced of the claim‘s em-
pirical support, she nonetheless concludes that potential negative effects on 
children from gamete sale are a relevant consideration in making policy. Id. 
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This argument runs into an imperfect Non-Identity Prob-
lem. Absent the inducement of compensation, it is unlikely that 
the intending parents would be able to find a surrogate or egg 
donors, as evidenced by the shortages experienced by Canada 
and Britain after banning donor compensation for eggs.143 
These compensation bans will thus frequently result in a de 
facto restriction on whether individuals can reproduce at all. 
Even if a State succeeded in recruiting a large population of al-
truistic donors, the Non-Identity Problem persists: so long as 
that population of altruistic egg/sperm donors and surrogates is 
different from the population of compensated ones (with whom) 
or conception occurs at a different time (when), the ban on com-
pensation cannot be said to be in the best interests of this 
child—the one who would exist in a commercialized regime but 
does not in one that makes compensation unlawful.144 The 
problem is imperfect because there may exist at least one child 
who will come into existence with the same genetic code wheth-
er or not such compensation is permitted. 
3. The Enforcement of Surrogacy Contracts 
BIRC justifications have been offered (alongside Paternal-
ism) for the nonenforceability of surrogacy agreements that al-
locate parenting rights, a position explicitly adopted by statute 
in some U.S. states.145  
Leading court decisions have pointed to BIRC grounds in 
holding surrogacy agreements unenforceable. In Matter of Baby 
M, the New Jersey Supreme Court famously held unenforcea-
 
 143. See, e.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 201 (2006). As to sur-
rogacy, The Baby M court explicitly noted this problem in its opinion, writing 
―all parties concede that it is unlikely that surrogacy will survive without 
money. Despite the alleged selfless motivation of surrogate mothers, if there is 
no payment, there will be no surrogates, or very few.‖ Matter of Baby M, 537 
A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988). 
 144. Unlike some of the other examples I have canvassed above, in this 
context it is not particularly the intent of the regulator to alter with whom in-
dividuals reproduce. That is, they would be just as happy if all donors and all 
recipients and the time of donation stayed exactly the same, just with ano-
nymity removed. Is that a relevant distinction? I think not; the question is 
whether the BIRC justification can be used to justify prohibitions on sperm 
donor anonymity, and any time we know that when, whether, or with whom 
we reproduce will be altered by an intervention (whether the regulator inde-
pendently desires that this occur or not) that makes the BIRC justification 
unavailing. 
 145. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 to 47/75 (West 2009); Hof-
man, supra note 136.  
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ble a traditional surrogacy agreement between William and 
Elizabeth Stern and Mary-Beth Whitehead, relying on analo-
gies to laws prohibiting baby-selling and requiring a best inter-
ests of the child judgment before authorizing adoption.146 The 
court‘s decision problematically suggests that surrogacy harms 
the interests of resulting children by decrying: 
[w]orst of all, however, is the contract‘s total disregard of the best in-
terests of the child There is not the slightest suggestion that any in-
quiry will be made at any time to determine the fitness of the Sterns 
as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive parent, their supe-
riority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the child of not living with 
her natural mother.147 
California court decisions on the enforcement of traditional 
and gestational surrogacy contracts have also considered 
whether enforcement of these contracts is in the best interests 
of the resulting children, without realizing the imperfect Non-
Identity Problem with that inquiry.148  
Similarly, in J.R. M.R. & W.K.J. v. Utah, a Utah federal 
court declared unconstitutional a Utah statute declaring that 
the gestational mother would always be granted legal paren-
tage.149 The court accepted the State‘s premise that protection 
of the best interests of the child could constitute a compelling 
interest sufficient to overcome a fundamental constitutional 
right, but found the statute infirm in that it failed to consider 
best interests on a case-by-case basis.150  
In other states, a BIRC-analysis has been built into the 
surrogacy process directly by statute. New Hampshire, for ex-
ample, statutorily requires judicial pre-clearance for a surroga-
cy agreement to be enforced and demands that the intended 
parents must be examined and a licensed child placement 
 
 146. 537 A.2d at 1227. 
 147. Id. at 1248. 
 148. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (―[A]s Professor 
S[c]hultz recognizes, the interests of children, particularly at the outset of 
their lives, are ‗[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose to 
bring them into being.‘ Thus, ‗[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults 
who will be responsible for a child‘s welfare is likely to correlate significantly 
with positive outcomes for parents and children alike.‘‖) (quoting Marjorie 
Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 397)); id. at 799–
800 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing that prior contractual agreements as to 
surrogacy should be ignored and parentage determined purely by inquiry as to 
which potential parent would serve the best interests of the children).  
 149. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002). 
 150. Id. 
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agency or the Department of Health and Human Services must 
perform a home study to verify that the intended couple can 
provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
other basic necessities.151 The Uniform Parentage Act adopts a 
similar approach.152 
This focus on BIRC considerations is also evident in scho-
larly work. Richard Epstein, no fan of the non-enforcement of 
surrogacy agreements, considers seriously the possibility that 
intended parents will abuse or neglect their child but presses 
―is there any reason to think that parents by surrogacy would 
not love the children whom they obtain by this arrangement? 
Of course the risks here are not zero . . . . But by the same to-
ken . . . children conceived by normal means often run a far 
greater risk of abuse.‖153 Other commentators make similar 
moves.154  
Once again this logic is problematic in that but-for the an-
ticipation that their surrogacy contract would be enforced, 
commissioning couples might have not used a surrogate at all, 
might have employed a different surrogate (e.g., a surrogate in 
another state or country that does enforce these contracts), or 
might have altered the timing of the insemination (for example 
by prolonging their search for an experienced surrogate). Per-
haps the Non-Identity problem is more imperfect here, but in 
any event it weakens the force of BIRC arguments.  
Intriguingly, the BIRC justification seems to have more 
force as to gestational surrogates, for in this case patients are 
 
 151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 to 18 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 152. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(3), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001) ((requiring inter 
alia, ―unless waived by the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made 
a home study of the intended parents and the intended parents meet the stan-
dards of fitness applicable to adoptive parents.‖) (alteration in original)).  
 153. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual En-
forcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2320–21 (1995). 
 154. See, e.g., Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Pre-
conception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 
429, 485 (2004) (―Are preconception agreements in the best interests of the 
children produced through such arrangements? No . . . . Absent a determina-
tion of the individual needs of a particular child, these agreements, even if 
pre-approved by a court, cannot be based upon a true best interest analysis.‖); 
Amanda M. Holliday, Who‟s Your Daddy (And Mommy)? Creating Certainty 
for Texas Couples Entering into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1101 (2003) (refuting BIRC type concerns by arguing that ―the most common 
users of surrogacy—infertile couples—are . . . more stable parents than people 
conceiving normally, and thus, the resulting child is more likely to have a sta-
ble and safe home‖) (quoting another source)). 
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usually seeking out a surrogate in which to implant an already 
(or soon-to-be) fertilized pre-embryo, such that the with whom 
dimension remains unchanged, suggesting the problem is more 
imperfect and the BIRC justification concomitantly stronger. 
This would suggest the opposite result from the case law, which 
is more likely to enforce gestational rather than traditional 
surrogacy agreements, for example the California Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Johnson v. Calvert.155 Of course, as dis-
cussed above, it is unsurprising that these courts are not at-
tuned to this particular difference given their general failure to 
consider the problems with BIRC reasoning. 
  * * *   
In this Part I have shown that a large number of state in-
terventions that influence when, whether, and with whom we 
reproduce are justified on BIRC grounds. However, as common-
ly presented—as a Millian Harm Principle concerned with the 
interests of vulnerable children, that is as an analogue to simi-
lar reasoning in family law governing child abuse or adoption—
what I have said demonstrates why the BIRC justificatory 
idiom is unpersuasive; indeed I would go so far as to say it is 
logically incoherent.  
III.  REBOOTING BEST INTERESTS? REFORMULATED 
BIRC JUSTIFICATIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS   
I have shown that courts, legislatures, and commentators 
frequently invoke BIRC justifications to ground a large number 
of interventions aimed at influencing when, whether, and with 
whom we reproduce, and why this is flawed in Perfect Non-
Identity Problem cases. In this Part I want to examine whether 
BIRC justifications could be saved or, perhaps more accurately, 
reformulated, and I examine three possible ways of doing so.156 
Throughout I consider whether these three approaches might 
justify some modes of intervention (e.g., informational, funding) 
but not others (e.g., bodily integrity infringements, criminal 
 
 155. See, e.g., 851 P.2d at 782 (Cal. 1993). Of course if things like timing of 
birth or the identity of the gestational parent were found sufficient to create 
Non-Identity Problems, gestational surrogacy agreements would pose the 
same problems. See supra note 38. 
 156. The non-person-affecting principle is arguably more of a break with 
BIRC, but each of the three are much closer to BIRC than the three substitute 
approaches I describe at the end of this Article and take up in Cohen, supra 
note 9. 
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prohibition, etc.).  
Because BIRC reasoning is only problematic for cases that 
produce children with lives worth living, I first consider wheth-
er we might still be able to use BIRC reasoning to justify the 
interventions discussed in Part II by arguing that if left un-
checked these reproductive activities would indeed create a life 
not worth living.  
Second, I examine whether the novel distinction I have in-
troduced between perfect and imperfect Non-Identity Problems 
may allow us to draw a distinction that would concede the un-
workability of BIRC justifications for the perfect cases but 
claim that it is a valid justification for intervening in the imper-
fect cases. 
Third, I adapt a proposal by philosophers (most prominent-
ly Parfit himself and Dan Brock) who suggest that the wrong-
fulness of these reproductive acts stems not from harming the 
children that result, but from the failure to produce children 
who suffered less or had more opportunity, what they call non-
person-affecting principles.157  
I show that each of these reformulations faces problems 
and none can ultimately save BIRC reasoning. At the end of 
this Part, I offer some brief tentative thoughts on the implica-
tion of what I have said for the constitutionality of the inter-
ventions discussed above. 
A. LIVES NOT WORTH LIVING 
The BIRC-justification is not problematic for cases where 
the resulting child will have a life not worth living because here 
one might argue that an individual has been harmed by being 
brought into existence. Is it at all plausible that courts, com-
mentators, and legislators could conclude that each of Part II‘s 
interventions prevents the existence of children who have ex-
actly that kind of life? 
It seems very unlikely. This kind of life has to be ―so bur-
densome and without compensating benefits to the individual 
with the disease that it is worse than never existing at all,‖ the 
kind where we might even say that abortion of the fetus was 
desirable for the child that would have resulted.158 While there 
is controversy as to whether ―lives not worth living‖ is an inco-
 
 157. See PARFIT, supra note 32; Brock, supra note 32.  
 158. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 233. 
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herent concept or a null set, even defenders of the concept think 
of the set as exceedingly small and usually mention two partic-
ularly awful diseases as possible members, Lesch-Nyhan and 
Tay-Sachs, and even these cases have proven controversial.159 
Infants with the incurable Lesch-Nyhan syndrome begin (at 
approximately 6 months of age) a process of neurological and 
physiological deterioration involving athetosis (involuntary 
writhing movements), severe mental deficiencies, and a ten-
dency towards compulsive self-mutilation often requiring plac-
ing the child‘s elbows in splints, wrapping her hands in gauze, 
and sometimes extracting all her teeth.160 Tay-Sachs has its 
onset in infancy and leads to ―hypotonia [deficiencies in muscle 
tone], progressive loss of vision, loss of interest in surround-
ings, and loss of attained milestones, with death occurring at 
about the age of 4.‖161 
Even assuming (arguendo) that growing up with a single or 
gay parent, a parent who is 50 at one‘s birth, without knowing 
one‘s genetic parent‘s identity, or with the knowledge that one 
was the result of market transactions produce a less-good-than-
average life, it seems very hard to conclude that any of these 
cases would produce a life not worth living. Of the cases dis-
cussed in Part II, only the severe genetic abnormalities stem-
ming from incest pose even an arguable case of a life not worth 
living. If one adopts a narrow conception of that category (as I 
do) containing Lesch-Nyhan syndrome and Tay-Sachs but not 
much else, even the conclusion that incest produces a life not 
worth living seems suspect. Further, in the wrongful life cases, 
the courts have routinely rejected the classification of compara-
bly serious genetic abnormalities as giving rise to a life not 
worth living.162 
 
 159. See, e.g., id.; Alexander M. Capron, Punishing Reproductive Choices in 
the Name of Liberal Genetics, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 683, 689 (2002) (―While 
the self-mutilation involved in Lesch-Nyhan disease seems Jobian in its hor-
ror, the lack of awareness of self-suffering that seems to characterize the neu-
rological collapse of infants affected by Tay-Sachs disease would lead many 
people to say that the latter is a condition that is nearly unbearable for the 
child‘s parents rather than for the child.‖). 
 160. E.g., Robert F. Weir, Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborn, 
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 416 (John D. Arido & Bonnie Stein-
bock eds., 4th ed. 1995). 
 161. See 5 ATTORNEYS‘ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 17.21(3) (Roscoe N. Gray 
& Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d. ed. 2000). 
 162. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 696–703 
(Ill. 1987) (Hemophilia B); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924–25 (Tex. 
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Thus, it seems implausible that any of the interventions 
discussed in Part II can be justified as preventing of lives not 
worth living, with the possible exception of the criminal prohi-
bition of adult brother-sister incest, but even that seems du-
bious.  
B. HOLDING THE LINE AT IMPERFECT NON-IDENTITY PROBLEMS 
In Part II I showed why BIRC justifications are a nonstar-
ter for perfect Non-Identity Problem cases. One possible re-
sponse is to concede that point only as to the perfect Non-
Identity Problems but not the imperfect ones (e.g., sperm donor-
anonymity, bans on selling gametes, the nonenforcement of 
surrogacy contracts).  
Recall that, in imperfect Non-Identity Problem cases, there 
may exist at least one child who will come into existence (in the 
sense that the child will have the same genetic code) whether 
or not the intervention is implemented because when, whether, 
and with whom an individual reproduces may remain un-
changed even if the intervention succeeds. If that result ob-
tains, one can say that the resulting child is harmed if the in-
tervention is not put in place since his or her counterfactual is 
not nonexistence but existence in a less well-off state without 
the protection of the intervention. For example, existing with 
knowledge of your genetic parentage is better than existence 
without that knowledge because of sperm donor anonymity, or 
at least so it is argued. As the number of individuals we predict 
to come into existence with the same genetic code whether or 
not the intervention is put in place increases, the Non-Identity 
Problem becomes increasingly imperfect.  
It is therefore useful to understand the imperfect Non-
Identity Problem as posing a problem of over-inclusivity as il-
lustrated in Diagram 3. The closer we are to a perfect Non-
Identity Problem, the more over-inclusive the intervention in 
that the intervention seeks to prevent a large number of repro-
ductive acts, but for only a small number of them is the BIRC-
justification appropriate. 
 
 
1984) (Duchenne muscular dystrophy). 
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Diagram 3 
 
Diagram 3 maps this by showing the number of cases 
where the intervention will have effect and the sub-set of those 
cases that can be justified on BIRC grounds. The rule is that 
with increasing perfection of the Non-Identity Problem there is 
increasing over-inclusivity. 
On the normative side, whether the perfect/imperfect dis-
tinction should make a difference as to whether BIRC ade-
quately justifies state intervention depends on high-level mor-
al/political theory commitments and what underlies the best 
interests of existing children type argument.  
On one extreme, the best interests argument could be 
thought of as a strong deontological side constraint on max-
imizing good states of the world, a sort of categorical rule that 
says ―state intervention should be set up in such a way that, to 
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the extent possible, no child is harmed.‖ At this extreme, the 
distinction between perfect and imperfect Non-Identity Prob-
lem cases will carry a lot of weight; for as long as one child will 
be harmed if sperm donor anonymity is permitted (for exam-
ple), that is a sufficient justification for state intervention not-
withstanding parental interests in using anonymous sperm do-
nor. In fact, though, the imperfect cases pose not just a 
question of the number of children harmed163 and the severity 
of harm, but also a problem of probability—like determining an 
electron‘s position at the atomic level—in any given case we do 
not know whether the same genetic child will in fact result and 
can also only make a probabilistic determination of harm, such 
that the side constraint distinguishing perfect and imperfect 
cases would have to be not ―do not harm even a single child‖ 
but instead ―do not entertain any probability of harm to even a 
single child.‖ 
It is beyond cavil that such a strong side constraint for the 
BIRC-type justification would go far beyond what we currently 
tolerate for state interventions to protect the best interests of 
existing children. The current rules pertaining to the detection 
and prosecution of child abuse, re-assignment of parentage, and 
other similar rules, have as their goal a reduction in the inci-
dence of harm to children. However, if instead we had a strong 
and single-minded side constraint of preventing the possibility 
of harm to a small number of children, we would entertain 
much more intrusive forms of state monitoring, such as closed-
circuit televisions in every room of every house with govern-
ment employees constantly watching. If one finds such a pro-
posal quite repulsive, as I do, that suggests that, as important 
as the welfare of existing children is, we are not comfortable 
with a very strong side constraint. We are implicitly adopting a 
framework that treats the probability and number of children 
who will be harmed as one consideration to be balanced against 
what a stronger intervention would mean for countervailing in-
terests in family privacy and child-rearing autonomy.164  
 
 163. And therefore the recurring moral theory problem of should the num-
bers matter. Cf. F. M. Kamm, Aggregation and Two Moral Methods, 17 UTILI-
TAS 1 (2005) (discussing the question whether in trade-off situations we should 
consider the relative numbers of people); John Taurek, Should the Numbers 
Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977) (similar). 
 164. Thus, we are implicitly endorsing an approach that trades off inva-
sions of privacy autonomy against the probability of harm, the number of 
children harmed, and the severity of harm to children. 
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If this more consequentialist analysis dominates as to best 
interests of existing children, it also seems appropriate as to 
best interests of resulting children. Harm to resulting children 
is bad, but the mere fact that children might be harmed does 
not itself tell us that an intervention to prevent that harm is 
justified. Rather we need to consider all costs and benefits, in-
cluding the effect on the welfare of the parents whose choices 
are barred by the intervention. In the sperm donor anonymity 
case, for example, these countervailing interests would include 
concerns about the privacy interests of donors, the autonomy of 
rearing parents to decide whether to reveal that the child was 
donor-conceived, shortages in sperm donations, and the cost 
and administrability of such a system.165 As the Non-Identity 
Problem becomes increasingly perfect and the intervention in-
creasingly over inclusive as to the harm it prevents, it becomes 
harder to justify on this analysis, even if we value parental 
rights and procreative autonomy very little indeed. 
If one believes in a broad and important conception of pro-
creative liberty,166 or otherwise finds important the parental in-
terests impinged on by the interventions discussed above, the 
appropriate tradeoff between parental interests and children‘s 
welfare in these imperfect cases should clearly and conclusively 
tilt against intervention. One would already demand a quite 
significant showing of detriment to child welfare to justify re-
strictions here absent the Non-Identity Problem, and whatever 
showing is made will have to be discounted by the much small-
er number and probability of children who will be harmed.  
But even if one thinks the importance of these parental in-
terests is frequently overstated, as long as those interests de-
serve some weight—which seems highly plausible—on this 
more consequentialist analysis, the trade-off will likely favor 
 
 165. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 95, at 117–29; Dennison, supra note 115, 
at 18–24; Pasquale Patrizio et al., Disclosure to Children Conceived with Do-
nor Gametes Should Be Optional, 16 HUM. REPROD. 2036, 2036–38 (2001) (dis-
cussing the various reasons parents would choose not to disclose and arguing 
that disclosure should be optional); Waldman, supra note 119, at 549–57 (de-
scribing the interests of adults in the disclosure debate). For my own take on 
these issues, see I. Glenn Cohen, Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of 
Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2011). 
 166. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 24 (1994) (―Procrea-
tive liberty should enjoy presumptive primacy when conflicts about its exercise 
arise because control over whether one reproduces or not is central to personal 
identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one‘s life.‖).  
 478 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:423 
 
parental interests in the imperfect cases from Part II. All of 
these cases are fairly close to the perfect end of the continuum 
such that the intervention is very over inclusive and the liberty 
of a large number of individuals will be limited in order to 
achieve a small probability of harm prevention for a small sub-
set of resulting children. If the parental interests set back by 
these restrictions deserve some weight, even if not treated as a 
super-value, when aggregated across a large number of indi-
viduals whose liberty will be restricted, the harm from diminu-
tion of those interests should outweigh the small probabilistic 
chance of harm as to a small number of children.167 Therefore, 
for these examples, holding the line at perfect Non-Identity 
cases seems difficult. 
It is important, though, to emphasize that this conclusion 
is dependent on the closeness of these cases to the perfect Non-
Identity Problem pole of the continuum. To see why, consider 
the following possible objection. There currently exists a set of 
child welfare rules protecting existing children by specifying 
that certain forms of child abuse will result in removing the 
child from parental custody and/or sanction of the parents. 
Those laws are avowedly premised on Best Interests of Existing 
Children reasoning, and at least initially seem immune from 
the Non-Identity Problem. But suppose a pair of parents, Mr. 
and Mrs. Hannigan, who plan on conceiving naturally, forth-
rightly admit (in song) to anyone who will listen that they in-
tend to give the daughter they have always hoped for (whom 
they will name Annie) a hard-knock life full of child abuse 
(though not abuse so bad as to make poor little Annie‘s life not 
worth living). Suppose further they specify that only if they can 
abuse their daughter will they go ahead and have one, and if 
instead the law prevents it or terminates their parental rights 
for abuse they will refrain from conceiving. Does my argument 
imply that the child abuse laws cannot be justified by best in-
terests reasoning because if they are in place Annie will never 
 
 167. Of course, if one attached a very small value to countervailing paren-
tal interests here, one might still reach the opposite conclusion that small 
probabilities of harm to small numbers of children did dominate. In this Ar-
ticle I have not tried to convince the reader how to value those interests. In-
deed, I am not sure I could if I tried, and I think the valuation of the interests 
differ across cases. Instead, I have tried to make it clear that one‘s valuation of 
these interests has to be much smaller than one might originally have 
thought, in order to justify the regulation. 
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be born, and even if being abused is bad it cannot be said to be 
worse than nonexistence? 
This is a very troubling and, as far as I know, novel argu-
ment. One way to avoid it might be to rely on one of the other 
strategies discussed below for determining that parental action 
is wrongful, notwithstanding the Non-Identity Problem, or to 
argue that there are constraints on what we can do to people 
once they are born, even if those constraints will discourage 
their being born.168 Allowing the perfect/imperfect line to do 
 
 168. In a brief exploration of whether the State should prohibit mistreating 
animals, Robert Nozick considered a similar claim he thought should be re-
jected: that we can eat animals because but-for our consumption they would 
not be born and ―[t]o exist for a while is better than never to exist at all.‖ RO-
BERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 38 (1974). To try to defeat this 
argument by a reductio ad absurdum, Nozick applied the same argument to 
parents and suggested that ―once a person exists, not everything compatible 
with his overall existence being a net plus can be done to him, even by those 
who created him‖ and then suggested the same should hold true for animals. 
Id. at 38–39; cf. Susan M. Wolf et al., Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagno-
sis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 327, 330–35 (2003) (making a similar point in explaining the ethical 
limitations that should restrain the ability of parents to genetically engineer 
donor children to help existing children, so called savior siblings).  
Even if Nozick is right about this claim, all of the examples from Part II, 
with one possible exception, differ from Nozick‘s hypothetical. In Nozick‘s hy-
pothetical, the harm to resulting children is separable and after the fact of 
their existence, whereas the harm in the examples from Part II is inherent in 
the resulting children and cannot be avoided if they are to exist as the particu-
lar people that they are. Sperm donor anonymity is a possible exception be-
cause it is possible to conceive of such anonymity as a continual kind of child 
abuse where the information is continually not released to the child and  
thereby harming it. Is this a good argument for distinguishing the sperm do-
nor anonymity case? In the environmental context, Axel Gosseries has pro-
posed a reason to think so that he calls the ―‗Last Judgment‘‖ approach. Axel 
Gosseries, On Future Generations‟ Future Rights, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 446, 460–61 
(2008). Gosseries imagines a man trying to decide whether to bicycle or drive 
his car home from work every day. He chooses to drive his car. Gosseries then 
imagines that, many years later, the man‘s 17-year-old daughter, who is an 
environmental activist, lambasts him for not bicycling and making the envi-
ronment worse as a result. The man responds by stating: ―‗had I done so, you 
would not be here.‘‖ Id. at 460. Had he used his bicycle, the man would have 
come home at a different time each day and thus slept with his wife at a dif-
ferent time and produced a different child. The father continues: ―‗Since your 
life in a polluted environment is still worth living, why blame me? I certainly 
did not harm you.‘‖ Id.  
Gosseries disagrees with the father. Id. at 461. He suggests that when 
there is overlap between generations (at least to some degree), there may be 
an asymmetry in the way the Non-Identity Problem immunizes pre- and post-
conception harms. ―As long as the father‘s pro-car choice was a necessary con-
dition for his daughter‘s existence, it remains unobjectionable‖ such that ―his 
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some work might offer us another way out. We might say that 
the portion of children who will exist, irrespective of whether 
child-abuse laws are put into place, is far greater than the por-
tion whose existence is dependent on whether or not child-
abuse laws are put into place (i.e. the ones for whom there is a 
Non-Identity Problem). Only a small number of parents like the 
Hannigans might really not reproduce, or alter the timing or 
partner for reproduction, unless allowed to abuse their child 
with impunity. Therefore, in this hypothetical, the Non-
Identity Problem is still imperfect, but much closer to the no 
Non-Identity Problem pole of the continuum, and one could 
conclude that the Hannigans are defensible casualties of an 
 
preconception actions are immune to moral criticism when it comes to alleged 
harms to his daughter.‖ Id. at 461. However, ―as soon as the daughter is con-
ceived, all the father‘s subsequent actions no longer fall within the scope of the 
non-identity context‖ such that ―we should expect the father to catch up as 
soon as his daughter has been conceived in order to be able, at the end of his 
life, to eventually meet‖ the obligations to her regarding the environment. Id. 
Even if the harm to the environment the father has already done is irreversi-
ble, says Gosseries, ―he should act in such a way as to compensate for such 
negative impacts through substitution measures (e.g., replacing an extin-
guished species with new energy-saving technology).‖ Id. 
Similarly, can we make the claim that the parents who have sought to use 
anonymous sperm donations should ―catch up‖ by revealing the child‘s identity 
later on and that this justifies the legal prohibition on sperm donor anonymi-
ty? I think not. The existence of a legal obligation of the sperm donor to place 
his name in a registry available to the child at age eighteen is what, as dis-
cussed above, is likely to alter donor and recipient behavior relating to when, 
whether, or with whom they reproduce. Thus, a legally enforceable ―catch up‖ 
obligation ―feeds back‖ into the conception decision and thus is not immunized 
from the Non-Identity Problem. Therefore, even in terms of sperm donor ano-
nymity, the Non-Identity Problem blocks harm to the resulting child as serv-
ing as a justification for the sperm donor identification law. 
Is Gosseries right as a moral matter at least? Can we at least say that 
parents, who do not make available to their donor-conceived children the do-
nors‘ identities, have acted immorally even if a legally enforceable obligation 
would not be justified? The matter is less clear, but so long as a parent can 
truthfully say ―if I knew I faced this moral obligation I would have not repro-
duced or I would have altered when or with whom I had reproduced, thereby 
producing a different child‖—that is that he or she would make different re-
productive decisions and thereby create a different child, then the same feed-
back problem seems to exist, even though what alters the behavior is a moral 
and not legal obligation. For further discussion of this anticipation argument, 
see Cohen, supra note 165. 
To some extent, Gosseries‘ proposal parallels a different line of responses 
to the Non-Identity Problem that I call ―Wronging While Overall Benefitting.‖ 
This response is exemplified by Seana Shiffrin‘s approach. Shiffrin, supra note 
33. I discuss this approach in greater detail in a companion piece. Cohen, su-
pra note 9.  
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over-inclusive but justifiable rule.169 This is quite different than 
the other cases we have discussed. Furthermore, one might 
suggest that in this case the claimed parental interest—
abusing one‘s child—is due much less, if any, weight as com-
pared to the procreative interests at issue in the cases dis-
cussed in Part II.170  
C.  NON-PERSON-AFFECTING PRINCIPLES 
The Non-Identity Problem is an obstacle for any argument 
that a restriction on whether, when, and with whom we repro-
duce is justified because it harms the child that is produced—
that is, for any argument premised on the idea that ―the indi-
viduals who experience suffering and limited opportunity in 
 
 169. This discussion may also provide a distinction between my cases and 
the environmental context. While changes to the environment may cause some 
variation in which individuals come into existence, the Non-Identity Problems 
posed will be much further from the perfect pole than in the cases I have been 
discussing, so more like the abuse hypothetical with the Hannigans. That is, 
so long as there exists a significant population of individuals who would exist 
whether or not the environmental intervention is put in place, harm to those 
individuals would be a good reason to prevent the environmental degradation. 
It is hard to imagine an environmental event that would completely (or nearly 
completely) change when, whether, or with whom individuals reproduced. As 
to such a hypothetical case where almost all future individuals will be differ-
ent, it may be that there is no BIRC-type justification for acting to prevent it. I 
intend my comments on the environmental case to be very tentative, in part 
because there may be several important distinguishing characteristics. These 
include the possibility that amoral value considerations like aesthetics may be 
relevant, that the discontinuation of our entire species deserves special atten-
tion, or that most preventable environmental degradations are likely to nega-
tively affect already-existing populations too such that BIRC may not be 
needed as a justification and we can rely on a pure externalities argument. 
 170. That response takes us into the complicated question of whether con-
sequentialist theories can endorse some form of preference-laundering, like 
determining whether a sadist‘s preference to see others suffer ought to count 
in determining welfare effects. See, e.g., L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, 
AND ETHICS 199–200 (1996) (―Does welfarism assign positive ethical value 
to . . . the enjoyment of others‘ misfortune? Worse, what about the sadistic 
pleasures of rapists or torturers?‖); Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of So-
cial Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 
183–94 (2000) (considering how to disregard certain preferences and how to 
―justify this ‗laundering of preferences‘‖). If we could, in advance, perfectly sort 
who is serious about procreating only if they are allowed to commit child 
abuse, should we have a rule exempting those people from the usual conse-
quences? Such a regime might still be objectionable in that it produces an in-
equality that unjustly favors those whose reproduction is conditioned on being 
able to abuse or out of moral hazard concerns that it might encourage parents 
to form these preferences to avoid inculpation. In any event, such sorting 
seems purely hypothetical. 
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one alternative exist without those effects in the other alterna-
tive.‖171 However, there is a separate family of what are called 
―non-person-affecting principles‖ which may be used to con-
demn the action.172 One such view suggests the world would be 
better off if, instead of person A who will experience serious 
suffering or limited opportunity coming into existence, person 
B, who will not experience such limited opportunities or suffer-
ing, would come into existence—that is, ―[a]lthough the person 
born with the condition in question would not have been 
harmed by birth, the world is better off if a person without that 
harm had been substituted in his place.‖173 Thus, on the non-
person-affecting principle ―[i]t is morally good to act in a way 
that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity in the 
world‖174 and therefore morally bad to act in a way that results 
in more of those things. The parent who produces a child who 
will experience serious suffering or limited opportunity has 
done something morally wrong when that parent could have 
produced a child who would not have experienced those 
things.175  
To illustrate, suppose that Desdemona engages in adult 
brother-sister incest that produces Cal, a child who, due to ge-
netic abnormality, psychological harm, or stigma, experiences 
serious suffering and diminished opportunity. The Non-Identity 
Problem tells us that the BIRC justification—that Cal is 
harmed—cannot do the work of justifying restrictions that 
would have prevented his birth. The non-person-affecting prin-
ciple suggests that the wrongfulness of the act stems from Des-
demona having given birth to Cal when she could have instead 
had a different child in Cal‘s place with a non-incestual part-
ner, a child who would not experience the suffering Cal does. 
She could have done better, or perhaps more accurately, she 
 
 171. Brock, supra note 32, at 273. 
 172. See, e.g., id. at 272–73 (explaining and giving an example of the non-
person-affecting principle). Parfit himself introduces non-person-affecting 
principles of the same variety immediately after presenting the Non-Identity 
Problem. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 359–61, 364–71. The term is a slight mis-
nomer in that the suffering that is diminishing welfare will be experienced by 
some person—it is not disembodied, it is just that the principle does not re-
quire the same person to suffer or not suffer based on the counterfactual; the 
relevant distinction is between same-number and same-person cases. Brock, 
supra note 32, at 273. 
 173. Robertson, supra note 32, at 16. 
 174. Brock, supra note 32, at 273. 
 175. Robertson, supra note 32, at 16. 
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could have avoided doing so badly. In a sense, this approach 
replaces Best Interests of the Resulting Child with Best Inter-
ests of the Resulting Population—BIRP (a term I would use if it 
did not sound like indigestion). 
The type of impersonal harm this argument invokes is very 
unusual as a justification for criminal law intervention. Ordi-
narily, society intervenes with criminal sanctions because there 
will be an identifiable ―victim‖ who is harmed or wronged, or, at 
least, a statistical but not yet identified victim.176 Non-person-
affecting principles posit that there can be wrongs that are ‗vic-
timless,‘ not in the colloquial sense of having very attenuated 
and indirect harms to people, as in the war on drugs, but where 
truly no one is harmed. For under a non-person-affecting prin-
ciple there is no one to lodge a first-person complaint against 
the actor or feel indignation or resentment; instead the claim is 
at the level of populations evaluated from an impersonal 
standpoint: the world would be better if its population looked 
like this rather than that.177  
To forestall confusion, let me emphasize that the non-
person-affecting approach is not a claim that the intervention is 
desirable for the sake of that other child. He will not be harmed 
if he is not brought into existence. It is also not a claim that the 
restriction on reproduction is justified because others in society 
benefit or are harmed by the child‘s existence. That is a sepa-
rate argument I discuss in a companion paper relating to re-
productive externalities; the non-person-affecting principle by 
contrasts says the action is wrongful even if those externalities 
are zero.178 What is the non-person-affecting argument then? It 
 
 176. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 34–36 (discussing harming and 
wronging). There are some tricky terminological nuances I self-consciously 
gloss over here in that there can be acts that wrong a person without harming 
him, or at least without harming him on balance. For more precision on these 
terms, see id. 
 177. See Johann Frick, Future Persons and Victimless Wrongs (2002) (un-
published manuscript at 4), available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/jtb538/ 
Frick.pdf. 
 178. To clarify the distinction: There could be cases where reproduction will 
produce a population that is better off from the non-person-affecting point of 
view but which imposes externalities on already-existing individuals that 
would not occur without the intervention. It is also possible to create a popula-
tion that would produce fewer externalized costs on others, yet be worse off 
from the non-person-affecting principle perspective. For example, creating a 
population that was more likely to die at the age when they had paid into So-
cial Security but before they needed to rely on social support might be better 
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is a claim that the world is better off even though no person is 
made better off; the world is better in an impersonal sense.179 
To make it clear exactly what it would mean to reject the 
non-person-affecting principle approach as a justification for 
criminalizing certain reproductive conduct, I should emphasize 
what doing so would not imply. It does not imply that the State 
is prohibited from imposing criminal sanction to protect the in-
terests of future persons who we know will exist and whose ex-
istence is independent of our sanction. Joel Feinberg gives an 
imaginative example of a criminal who plants a time bomb in 
the closet of a kindergarten and sets a timing device to go off 
six years hence.180 Eventually, the bomb goes off, ―killing or 
mutilating dozens of five-year-old children.‖181 As Feinberg 
rightly concludes, even though the criminal might deny he 
caused the harm to the children because they did not exist 
when he performed the act of placing the bomb, that should be 
no excuse because his act ―set in train a causal sequence that 
led directly to the harm.‖182 Nothing I say in this Article is to 
the contrary. What is important for the kindergarten case is 
that there is no reason to think that whether or not we punish 
the criminal will determine whether these children come into 
existence. That is, it will not alter when, whether, or with 
whom their parents conceive. Thus, there is no Non-Identity 
Problem. These children will come into existence and these 
children will be harmed if the act is not deterred through crim-
inal liability. Our cases are different, though, for the reasons 
we have been discussing throughout this Article—whether or 
not we put in place criminal liability will determine whether 
these particular children come into existence, thus we cannot 
say that criminalizing the conduct prevents harm to these 
children, as we can in the time bomb case. For the same reason, 
rejecting criminal liability for the cases this Article discusses 
does not require rejecting criminal liability for environmental 
 
in terms of externalized costs, but would be worse on non-person-affecting 
grounds because these individuals would face more limited opportunity. 
 179. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 369 (―If in either of two possible outcomes 
the same number of people would ever live, it will be worse if those who live 
are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have 
lived.‖).  
 180. JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 
12 (1992). 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.  
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damage or crimes against fetuses that will harm the children 
those fetuses will become.183 
With those clarifications in mind, we can now discuss the 
non-person-affecting principle approach on its own terms. The 
approach gives us a way to condemn reproductive practices like 
those discussed in Part II that do not run afoul of the Non-
Identity Problem. There are, however, a number of serious 
challenges to using this approach as a justification for state in-
terventions seeking to influence when, whether, and with 
whom we reproduce. Here, I examine four kinds of critiques: (1) 
does the limitation of the approach to same-number cases (if 
justified) make it an inadequate substitute for BIRC; (2) is the 
approach problematically underinclusive; (3) is the approach 
sensible even as a criterion of moral wrongfulness, or does it 
carry with it problematic implications; and (4) can the approach 
even justify criminal sanctions? Each of these is a separate con-
cern regarding this approach that collectively suggest it to be a 
poor substitute for BIRC in justifying these interventions. 
1. The Limitation to Same-Number Cases 
The most serious concern with the non-person-affecting 
principle approach is that, on its face, it can only justify a much 
smaller subset of the interventions from Part II than BIRC 
aims to justify. According to Brock and Parfit, non-person-
affecting principles have built in to them the limitation that 
they apply only to ―same-number‖ cases—where the same 
number of persons exist in either counterfactual and we merely 
substitute the person who would experience more opportunity 
or less suffering (i.e. the higher welfare person) for the one who 
would experience less opportunity or more suffering (i.e. the 
lower welfare person).184 This is to be contrasted with ―differ-
 
 183. What to think about harm-to-fetus cases would depend on a separate 
question of one‘s criterion for the continuity of personal identity between fe-
tuses and the children they become, and whether or not changes in personal 
identity of this sort are sufficient to create a Non-Identity Problem. See Cohen, 
supra note 19, at 354–59. There are similar, but even more difficult, questions 
about whether Non-Identity Problems occur from genetic manipulations of 
pre-embryos, as I have also discussed elsewhere. Id. at 357. In other words, 
one can support criminal liability as to the fetal or pre-embryonic cases but 
reject it as to the cases I discuss here.  
 184. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 360–61; Brock, supra note 32, at 273. 
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ent-number cases‖ where, if the intervention is put in place, a 
different number of children will come into existence.185  
It is only in same-number cases that the non-person affect-
ing principle approach can declare that the world is better off 
from an impersonal standpoint if the substitution takes place. 
The reason offered by Brock and his colleagues is that while the 
―intuitive point underlying [the non-person-affecting principle] 
is that it is good to prevent suffering and promote happiness 
even if doing so reduces no person‘s suffering and increases no 
person‘s happiness,‖ when that principle is applied to ―differ-
ent-number cases, that implies Parfit‘s Repugnant Conclu-
sion.‖186 The Repugnant Conclusion is that ―[f]or any possible 
population of at least ten billion people, all with very high qual-
ity of life, there must be some much larger imaginable popula-
tion whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, 
even though its members have lives that are barely worth liv-
ing.‖187 That is, if we extend the principle we have been discuss-
ing to ―cases with different numbers of persons,‖ that would 
―imply we should increase total happiness slightly by vastly in-
creasing the population, even though we thereby make every 
existing person much worse off,‖ and it is only ―person-affecting 
principles [that] seem likely to avoid unacceptable implications 
like the Repugnant conclusion, since only they require that a 
reduction in suffering or an increase in happiness be to a dis-
tinct individual.‖188  
Let me unpack that a bit. As part of a consequentialist 
theory—I will use utilitarianism here instead of other variants 
of consequentialism for explanatory simplicity189—one could 
have two quite different views about how to aggregate utility 
between persons. Total utilitarians would sum up the utility of 
every individual in the set such that (to use fictional numbers) 
a population of 100,000 people with utility of five each would be 
more desirable than a population of 50,000 people with utility 
five each; by contrast average utilitarians would divide all utili-
 
 185. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 360–61 (contrasting ―Same Number Choices‖ 
with ―Different Number Choices‖). 
 186. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254. 
 187. PARFIT, supra note 32, at 388. 
 188. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254–55.  
 189. Deontologists face a similar problem as well, since they often begin 
with a commitment to pursuing the Good, but merely add constraints and  
options.  
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ty by the number of individuals in the population such that 
both of those hypothetical populations are equally desirable.190 
Different numbers cases might be thought of as coming in 
two variants, those that will produce fewer children (including 
zero) and those that will produce more children. Those policies 
that will produce fewer children—all the regulations affecting 
whether individuals reproduce directly have this effect, and 
many of the regulations of when, and with whom individuals 
reproduce may de facto have this effect as discussed above—
should be disfavored by a total utilitarian as long as the result-
ing children will have lives worth living. So long as the child‘s 
life will have positive utility (i.e. a life worth living), it is al-
ways better for there to come into existence one additional child 
for they add to the total utility. Thus, on the total utilitarian 
view, a non-person-affecting principle cannot ordinarily support 
regulating reproduction when it produces fewer children,191 as 
most of the interventions from Part II actually do, and these in-
terventions should thus be disfavored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal 
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 113 (1979) (discussing the difference between 
average and total utilitarianism and the debate between scholars on which 
type to use).  
 191. I say ―ordinarily‖ because this conclusion is only completely assured in 
cases where the intervention reduces the existing set of children to zero or 
where the welfare of the children born is independent. One could at least con-
ceive of an intervention that, instead of producing three children who each 
have a utility of seven, produced two children who have utilities of six and 
twenty respectively. In such a case the total utilitarian would favor the inter-
vention because it produces a greater utility. While there is no reason to think 
any of the interventions I am discussing would have this structure, it is impor-
tant to be precise.  
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Diagram 4 
 
 
However, it is exactly the total utilitarian reasoning that 
threatens to lead to the Repugnant Conclusion which is illu-
strated in the top half of Diagram 4: we could vastly expand our 
population from the bar on the left (seven billion people with 
utility five each = thirty-five billion total utility) to the bar on 
the right (eighty billion people with utility .5 each = forty bil-
lion total utility). This would result in a much larger number of 
people with lives just barely worth living, thus increasing total 
utility but producing people with much worse lives than we 
currently have. Thus, these forms of regulation cannot be justi-
fied in different-number cases on non-person-affecting prin-
ciples if one is a total utilitarian; but being a total utilitarian 
also seems to lead to an unacceptable conclusion.192 
 
 192. I say ―seems‖ because one option would be to accept the Repugnant 
Conclusion as not so repugnant after all. See, e.g., Torbjörn Tännsjö, Why We 
Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion, 14 UTILITAS 339 (2002). I will not 
examine this possibility here, except to suggest that some of the intuitive re-
pugnance of the conclusion may stem from improperly thinking of our popula-
tion actually becoming the other one in which case our own lives would actual-
ly be made less good rather than a scenario in which we imagine choosing 
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One might argue that this conclusion can be evaded by ac-
cepting average rather than total utility as a measure of what 
makes a state of the world better: a non-person-affecting prin-
ciple approach premised on average utilitarianism can support 
these kinds of regulations in different-number cases because 
the additional children whose existence the regulation seeks to 
prevent, while adding to the total utility in the world will, if 
―below-average,‖ lower the average utility in the world.193 Thus, 
on the average utilitarian version of the non-person-affecting 
principle, reproducing in such circumstances is wrong because 
it lowers average utility. However, average utilitarianism also 
appears to lead us to a different kind of repugnant conclusion, 
which Parfit calls the ―Mere Addition Paradox‖ (represented in 
the lower half of Diagram 4), that the world would be better if 
Adam and Eve, both with a very high utility, existed alone than 
if in addition to Adam and Eve there also existed fifty billion 
other people with very good lives but utilities just below Adam 
and Eve (say 9.99999999 repeating).194 That is, the latter world 
is a worse one, since the addition of these people has dimi-
nished the average from what it was with just Adam and Eve 
existing. This conclusion seems wrong. Indeed, perhaps still 
more strangely the average utilitarian should be indifferent as 
to Adam and Eve, each with utility ten, existing versus Adam 
and Eve plus fifty billion other people, all with utility ten, exist-
ing, for in each case the average utility is exactly the same. 
Both Brock and Parfit candidly admit that the only way to 
avoid both of these paradoxes is to provide a comprehensive 
theory that mixes person-affecting and non-person-affecting 
principles—they call it ―Theory X‖—but that no such compre-
hensive theory has yet been formulated.195 Therefore, Brock 
and his co-authors limit the scope of the application of non-
person-affecting principles to same-number cases.196 The impli-
 
between creating one population or the other ab initio. Accepting the Repug-
nant Conclusion and total utilitarianism would appear to stack the deck fur-
ther against the interventions in Part II, for it would favor producing more 
children and not fewer. I will discuss these matters further in a Beyond Best 
Interests, when discussing reproductive externality approaches. See Cohen, 
supra note 9.  
 193. See Robertson, supra note 32, at 17 (providing reasons to use average 
utilitarianism when the numbers differ).  
 194. See PARFIT, supra note 32, at 419–21. 
 195. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254–55; PARFIT, supra note 32, at 
390. 
 196. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 254–55. 
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cation for our purposes is that only in same-number, but not 
different-number cases, can we say that the world is imperso-
nally better without leading to conclusions about other cases 
we find intuitively unacceptable. The same/different-number 
distinction usefully maps on to one dimension of the taxonomy I 
developed in Part I. Attempts to target whether individuals re-
produce are by definition not same-numbers cases and there-
fore unjustifiable by this framework. The limitation runs dee-
per, however, because interventions targeting with whom or 
when we reproduce may de facto lead to no reproduction at all. 
For example bans on commercialized surrogacy, refusal to con-
tractually enforce surrogacy agreements, and prohibitions of 
donor anonymity, may result in shortages of sperm or eggs or 
surrogates or reluctance of prospective parent to reproduce on 
these terms.  
As to this de facto point, let me dwell on one way in which 
my account differs subtly from that of Parfit and Brock. They 
are concerned with the morality of certain reproductive deci-
sions that may produce children who are less well-off than they 
could have been. From the point of view of whether a parent 
acted morally wrong, they propose as a test of whether we are 
in a same-numbers case whether the parents could have substi-
tuted a better-off child for the worse-off one, with the idea being 
that if they could they failed by not doing so. Even at the level 
of what is meant by could I think there are some hard ques-
tions,197 but the larger point here is that, when we are asking 
 
 197. Brock and his co-authors use an example of two parents who are ―vir-
tually certain to genetically transmit the disability to any child they conceive‖ 
such that ―[i]f they choose not to have a child with a disability and can have no 
other child instead, the result is one fewer children—a different-number case.‖ 
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 255. Suppose, however, that it is only the 
combination of both parents‘ genetic material that produces the disabled child; 
could they not avoid that result by using one of their gametes along with 
sperm or egg donated from a third-party? Even if they each had genetic ma-
terial certain to produce the disability, could they not still produce a healthy 
child with the mother serving as gestational parent and using both donated 
sperm and egg? John Robertson has suggested that even in cases like these 
where we could make same-number substitutions, we may want to make an 
exception and not treat the failure to substitute as wrongful if it ―unreasona-
bly burden[s] parents,‖ and has suggested as examples cases where it would 
―require that the parents give up having a genetically related child and accept 
childlessness, adoption, or use of a gamete donor.‖ Robertson, supra note 32, at 
16–17. Whether we ought to make an exception for such cases on the ―could‖ 
view should depend, in part, on prior normative judgments about the value of 
having genetically related children. See generally Cohen, Genetic Parent, su-
pra note 5, at 1189–90 (discussing parental adoption preferences); Cohen, su-
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what interventions a state motivated by non-person-affecting 
principles ought to adopt, the question should subtly shift from 
one of whether these parents could have made a same-number 
substitution to whether they will make such substitutions if 
the intervention is put in place. If the intervention has the ac-
tual effect of reducing the number of children born rather than 
inducing same-number substitutions, the State cannot pursue 
it in the name of non-person-affecting principles since we can-
not say the world has been made better off in an impersonal 
sense with the intervention in place.198 
For these reasons, until we develop Theory X, the non-
person-affecting principle approach is at most only a limited 
substitute for BIRC reasoning because it extends only to same-
number cases and thus excludes many of the examples in 
Part II. 
This is such a significant limitation to a non-person-
affecting approach that it would be desirable to be able to relax 
it and show that non-person-affecting principles could apply 
even in some different-number cases. Adopting a proposal put 
forth by Thomas Hurka in the adjacent field of population eth-
ics, Philip Peters has recently proposed a theory that combines 
average and total utility as a way to avoid both the Repugnant 
Conclusion and the Mere Addition Paradox and thus allow the 
use of this framework in some different-number cases.199 On 
 
pra note 19 (discussing tort liability for parents who intentionally have a dis-
abled child).  
 198. While I think this is right, the point is not self-evident and may de-
pend on whether one views the intervention through a more retributivistic 
lens or as a more consequentialist attempt at influencing social policy. If one 
adopts the more retributivistic perspective, it is possible to conclude that per-
son has acted immorally by failing to substitute for another child, and that 
even if the intervention is put in place they will not actually substitute, and 
that they should be punished because they have acted wrongfully. On this 
view, punishment is warranted for a wrongful action, even though it is a 
wrongful action the possibility of punishment would not have prevented. I am 
not attracted to this position, in which individuals are punished in the name of 
non-person-affecting principles even though the intervention does not make 
the world better from an impersonal standpoint, but others may be. In any 
event, this perspective may be much better suited for defending criminal law 
interventions where retributivist impulses have a larger role to play. Yet, as I 
explain below, criminal law interventions may be the hardest to defend on the 
non-person-affecting principle approach for separate reasons. 
 199. Philip G. Peters, Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State 
Regulation of Reproductive Liberty, in 35 HARMING FUTURE PERSONS: ETHICS, 
GENETICS, AND THE NONIDENTITY PROBLEM 317, 326 (MELINDA A. Roberts & 
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this theory ―total utility declines in importance relative to av-
erage utility as populations increase‖ such that ―the value that 
an additional individual contributes to the world is not con-
stant, but varies with the number of other humans alive‖ so 
that after a crisis that decimated our population the value of an 
additional person‘s existence would be huge while as the popu-
lation reaches its current size the value of an additional person 
would greatly diminish.200 Peters writes that this approach at-
tractively avoids the Repugnant Conclusion ―by giving more 
weight to average utility when population levels are high.‖201 
Although he does not make this point, so long as total utility 
always retains some weight in the calculus the view also avoids 
one version of the Mere Addition Paradox in that adding an in-
dividual with identical utility to all other individuals (leaving 
the average unchanged) remains preferable because total utili-
ty acts at the very least as a ―tie breaker.‖ How this solution 
does with another version of the Mere Addition Paradox, say a 
population that looks like ours with average utility of ten ver-
sus a population that is twice as large but with just slightly less 
average utility (9.99999), is less clear and would depend on 
precisely how much total gives way to average utility and at 
what point.  
Peters is to be congratulated for making such a clever and 
subtle addition to this literature, but how good of a solution is 
this to the different-number cases, really? Determining the 
right mix of total and average utility to precisely avoid these 
paradoxes seems to construct a bit of a ―just-so story.‖ Perhaps 
it is only by reflecting on such intuitions that one can deter-
mine the proper shape of a utilitarian theory, but while the in-
tuitions behind Total and Average Utilitarian approaches are 
quite clear, the intuitions behind this theory are less than pel-
lucid. In any event, it seems to me that the bigger deficit with 
the theory is that it errs in identifying what it is we think is 
wrong in reproduction when we think it wrong. Because the 
theory calls on us to heavily weight average utility when the 
population is the size of ours, it means that the wrongfulness of 
a reproductive act depends on whether the child created is 
above or below the average utility of all other existing individ-
 
David T. Wasserman eds. 2009) (citing Thomas Hurka, Value and Population 
Size, 93 ETHICS 496 (1983)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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uals—but that seems deeply counterintuitive. Why should the 
wrongfulness of my reproductive activity be measured relative 
to that of other reproducers in my society? Because we are in a 
different-number case it is not an argument that I could have 
done better by substitution but instead an acknowledgment 
that, although I could not have done better, because others did 
do better, my act is wrong.202 Why treat the average as the mo-
rally significant baseline? The average utility of the world is 
quite different today than in 1850, which means that producing 
the same child could be morally permissible in 1850 but moral-
ly impermissible today.  
Consider your own life. Most of us think that our parents 
did not act wrongly by producing us. And yet this approach 
would suggest that to know if that is right we would have to 
compare our utility with that of all other persons in society at 
the moment of our birth, and if we fall below the mean our exis-
tence could validly (indeed should) have been prohibited. In-
deed, if tomorrow, other parents begin having children with 
much higher utility than our own utility, then our reproduction 
which was permissible today would suddenly become wrongful 
tomorrow, notwithstanding that no fact about our own lives has 
changed. This seems deeply troubling and so out of sorts with 
our conceptions of what makes particular acts of reproduction 
wrongful as to be a serious mark against Peters‘s otherwise 
elegant solution, or any approach with a high weighting of av-
erage utility.  
Thus, I conclude that the limitation of non-person-affecting 
principles to same-number cases (and the concomitant narrow-
ing of regulations on reproduction the non-person-affecting 
principle can support) persists. This represents a serious mark 
against the non-person-affecting approach to the extent it is of-
fered as an adequate BIRC substitute, ruling it out for many 
(the whether interventions), if not all (many of the when and 
with whom interventions), in Part II.203  
 
 202. This distinguishes and sharpens the critique from one I make regard-
ing enhancement. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.a. There, the problematic 
implication is that we do wrong by failing to enhance, to substitute for en-
hanced children in same-number cases, when we can do so. Here the claim is 
that we act wrongly by failing to have average or above-average children even 
when we cannot do so, and thus the State can validly prevent us from having 
any children at all. 
 203. To be clear, neither Brock nor Parfit argues that non-person-affecting 
principles are a total substitute for person-affecting ones and intends them to 
compliment not supplement person-affecting approaches. What I have shown, 
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2. Underinclusivity 
Even if non-person-affecting principles are limited to justi-
fying purely same-number substitution interventions, or if this 
limitation is overcome, there are several other reasons why this 
framework seems inadequate, to which I now turn. 
Deploying the non-person-affecting principle argument to 
defend the interventions of Part II shows them to be problemat-
ically underinclusive. There are many forms of reproduction 
producing comparable (or worse) non-person-affecting principle 
deficits where no such intervention has been imposed. If many 
of us would reject intervention in those cases, and those cases 
cannot meaningfully be distinguished, that casts doubt about 
how good this reformulation is as a BIRC substitute.  
To wit, the genetic abnormalities resulting from brother-
sister incest are less likely to result and also less serious in 
terms of their effects on the population of resulting children 
than those that result from the mating of carriers of Tay-Sachs 
or a number of other genetic disorders. And yet our government 
has not required mandatory screening for these disorders—an 
intervention which is less liberty-intrusive as to particular in-
dividuals than the criminalization of brother-sister incest since 
it would merely force individuals to have the information, not 
control their sexual relationships—and it certainly has not 
made it illegal for Tay-Sachs carriers to reproduce. If you think 
that brother-sister incest may be unique on legal moralistic 
grounds, the same point could be made as to many of the other 
interventions I have discussed. Another example comes from 
the alleged effects on child welfare of single parenthood: the 
harms that it is claimed will occur from single parenthood will 
be the same whether it arises coitally or through reproductive 
technology, such that someone who defends a restriction on re-
productive technology use by single individuals ought also ap-
ply the same limit on coital reproduction intended to give rise 
to single parenthood. 
Underinclusivity might not be normatively problematic if 
there were meaningful distinctions between what is regulated 
and left unregulated, perhaps drawing on the difficulty and in-
trusiveness of attempts to regulate natural reproductive (as 
opposed to assisted reproductive) behavior. That response, 
however, fails to perfectly capture the current line of regulation 
 
though, is that I do not think they can replace BIRC (which will not work for 
reasons discussed) in justifying these interventions. 
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in that we have in fact directly regulated adult sexual activity 
by criminalizing brother-sister incest while leaving alone pro-
creative activities that portend much more certain and signifi-
cant non-person-affecting harms, so we ought to be cautious be-
fore fully buying into this possible distinction.204  
One might argue that the interests that would be set back 
in the natural reproduction context are weightier than those in 
the artificial reproduction context; state interference with sex-
ual intimacy is more noxious than preventing an individual 
from receiving a particular type of medical assistance necessary 
to reproduce. Is that right? As a number of authors have sug-
gested, the natural/artificial line ought to carry no weight.205 I 
suspect that views to the contrary are the product of misfires of 
intuitions on positive versus negative liberty; they are misfires 
because both preventing access to reproductive technology and 
preventing coital reproduction are negative liberty violations. If 
governments restricted themselves to selective funding of as-
sisted reproduction it would not be underinclusive because that 
is a positive liberty intervention, but my point holds for most of 
the other means. 
One might try to more defensibly distinguish sub-
categories of assisted reproductive technology use, for example 
by hiving-off assisted reproduction involving the gametes of 
partners in an intimate relationship from that using the ga-
metes of strangers to that relationship. Whether that move is 
persuasive depends on one‘s valuation of different forms of pro-
creative and parental autonomy. This is a big question, and one 
that deserves its own article, so I will just confine myself to a 
couple of brief remarks. The philosopher Daniel Statman has 
described the interest in reproduction as:  
the desire to achieve a kind of immortality by continuing to live 
through descendants, the desire to live vicariously through one‘s 
children, getting a second chance, as it were, the desire for the deep 
and enduring intimate relations that one hopes to achieve with one‘s 
offspring, the longing for a home, a nest, a secure place with a close 
 
 204. That said, one might avoid this problem by decriminalizing brother-
sister adult incest but retaining the other interventions discussed or by ar-
guing that the brother-sister incest case is special and criminalization is justi-
fied by a quite different and independent reason, such as the Legal Moralism I 
sketch below. See infra notes 221–23. 
 205. Robertson, supra note 32, at 31–36; Statman, supra note 16, at 228 
(―There seems to be no relevant difference between natural and artificial pro-
creation that could explain why the former should enjoy a stronger protection 
than the other.‖). 
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network of relationships in which one belongs, and, in addition, the 
interest of couples to found a family.206 
On one reading of that list, only reproduction by those 
without any genetic tie to the offspring (none of the cases in 
Part II) is distinguished. On a different reading, reproduction 
that involves even one non-intimate partner (single, lesbian or 
gay parents, commercialized surrogacy) is justified because of 
the lower status of the interests represented by that kind of 
procreation. Would we be right in thinking that for the interest 
to be worth protecting, there must be a perfect overlap between 
the genetic partners, romantic partners, and rearing partners? 
Certainly some religious conceptions of procreation that con-
demn it outside of marriage view reproduction as worthy be-
cause it unifies an already existing romantic relationship, but 
that is a conception against which many of us would chaff. 
Even if this kind of move succeeds (and I am not at all sure it 
does) it still would not defend drawing the line between coital 
and assisted reproduction as such; instead it would counsel 
making a division between reproduction by single parents, 
however it is achieved, and reproduction by intimate partners. 
Thus, the underinclusivity seems to persist and demands that 
we either reject some of the interventions in Part II or add pro-
hibitions on their coital equivalents. If we are unwilling to do 
so, that is some reason to doubt the non-person-affecting prin-
ciple approach as a sufficient justification. 
3. The Soundness of the Non-Person-Affecting Principle 
Approach as a Moral Criterion 
Putting aside underinclusivity, and even as to cases involv-
ing genuine same-number substitutions, there is a further 
question as to whether the non-person-affecting approach is 
problematic on its own terms. I will only briefly touch on two 
objections that relate to enhancement and eugenics.  
a. Enhancement 
The first objection is that the non-person-affecting prin-
ciple proves too much in that it ought to justify not only the 
moral wrongfulness of reproductive decisions to avoid what I 
have elsewhere called diminishment207—producing a child who 
is on balance significantly worse-off as compared to the ‗normal‘ 
 
 206. Statman, supra note 16, at 226. 
 207. Cohen, supra note 19. 
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child (scare quotes to emphasize the normative baggage behind 
such labeling), a child who will ―experience serious suffering or 
limited opportunity‖208—but also a duty to engage in enhance-
ment—to produce a child who is, on balance, significantly bet-
ter-off as compared to the normal child. This point is suggested 
by the Oxford philosopher Julian Savulescu (although he does 
not treat it as a problem) who argues for a ―moral obligation to 
have the best children‖ that he calls the principle of ―Procrea-
tive Beneficence‖: ―couples (or single reproducers) should select 
the child, of the possible children they could have, who is ex-
pected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the oth-
ers, based on the relevant, available information.‖209 If the 
world would be worse, in an impersonal sense, if there comes 
into existence a child who experiences more serious suffering 
and loss of opportunity, than if there comes into existence a 
child who experiences the normal amount of these things, why 
would it not be even better with children who experience still 
less of these things than the normal child? This too can be 
thought of as an underinclusivity problem, with the State‘s ac-
tions being problematic in taking steps to prevent parents di-
minishing their children but not pushing parents to enhance, 
when under non-person-affecting principles the two are equiva-
lent. Otherwise put, this is a baseline problem familiar to legal 
academics that asks why the level of serious suffering, happi-
ness, or opportunity of the normal child today is normatively 
significant.  
Notice, though, what adopting a duty to enhance would 
mean: it is not enough to avoid an incestuous reproductive 
partner, one would have failed in one‘s duty if one did not 
choose as good a reproductive partner for one‘s child as possi-
ble. It is not enough to abstain from reproductive sex during 
one‘s adolescent years, instead a woman might fail in her duty 
 
 208. Brock, supra note 32, at 273. It is worth noting that if we take serious-
ly the qualifier ―serious‖ that may in and of itself rule out the use of this ar-
gument for a large number of the interventions discussed in Part II since 
whatever possible setbacks could be avoided in an impersonal sense by substi-
tution do not rise to the level of being ―serious‖ ones. 
 209. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the 
Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413, 415 (2001). While Savulescu seems to equi-
vocate between choosing a child with the ―the best life‖ and one with ―at least 
as good a life as the others,‖ the logic of the non-person-affecting principle and 
his argument suggests it should be the former. Id. But see Rosamund Scott, 
Why Parents Have No Duty to Select „the Best‟ Children, 2 CLINICAL ETHICS 
149, 151 (2007) (noting this implication of Savulescu‘s approach). 
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to her child unless she waits until her career, wealth, etc., are 
in the ideal position for child-rearing. And, if genetic enhance-
ments improving the lives of the children who result are possi-
ble, one who fails to use them would have failed in this duty. 
Unlike Savulescu, who views this implication as commonsen-
sical, I believe that if endorsing non-person-affecting principles 
required this conclusion that would be a reason not to endorse 
them.  
Still more troubling is what this means for legal regulation 
of reproduction. If, in spite of my objections in this Part, one 
takes the non-person-affecting principle approach to justify le-
gal regulation of reproduction for cases involving diminish-
ment, and the non-person-affecting principle approach does not 
distinguish diminishment and enhancement, then legal regula-
tion (including criminal sanction) of reproduction to force en-
hancement is equally justified.210 
Can the non-person-affecting principle approach avoid that 
implication? It is not clear. One response is that some amount 
of suffering or diminished opportunity is good for children. 
That is a contestable empirical claim, but even granting it 
would merely lop off the extreme end of the continuum: insofar 
as there are enhancements which improve children‘s lives but 
not past this threshold of a too-protected population we have a 
duty to enhance, and the state would be justified in enforcing 
it. This would still generate a robust duty to enhance unless by 
some ―just-so story‖ we think that children currently get just 
the right amount of suffering and lack of opportunity, which 
seems implausible.  
A different set of responses suggests that the diminish-
ment-enhancement distinction maps on to act-omission distinc-
tions in American law, or that the relevant distinction is be-
tween those committed to a maximization thesis and those who 
adopt a sufficientarian approach. I take up both of these claims 
as to the Reproductive Externalities argument in a companion 
paper,211 and will not repeat my objections here but instead di-
rect the interested reader to that discussion. 
 
 210. Interestingly, while Savulescu endorses the idea that doctors should 
―attempt[ ] to persuade [parents] to have the best child they can,‖ he actually 
dismisses off-hand the possibility of state intervention because of ―the pre-
sumption in favour of liberty in liberal democracies.‖ Savulescu, supra note 
209, at 425. This may just mean he implicitly accepts my claim that non-
person affecting principles cannot justify restrictions on liberty. 
 211. Cohen, supra note 9. 
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A different response is that enhancements are distinguish-
able in practice because there are safety or theological concerns 
with genetic manipulation,212 because some enhancements are 
not good for the child (to the extent they allow parents to heg-
emonically foreclose certain avenues for the child instead of se-
curing a ―right to an open future‖),213 because we lack sufficient 
foresight to pick good traits,214 or because the availability of 
enhancements problematically exacerbates inequalities be-
tween those who have access to enhancing technologies and 
those who do not.215 Even assuming arguendo that these points 
were true as to all genetic enhancements, the arguments seem 
less apposite as to the duties towards nongenetic forms of ―en-
hancement‖ that parallel our cases (delaying reproduction, 
choosing particular reproductive partners, etc). 
The most plausible way I can imagine to distinguish dimi-
nishment and enhancement in this context would instead point 
to the comparative burdensomeness of the two principles as re-
strictions on our autonomy to pursue important life projects: 
that Savulescu‘s principle of procreative beneficence will im-
pose much greater constraints relative to Brock‘s more limited 
non-person-affecting principle. However, the assumption that 
the enhancement/diminishment line maps neatly on to the 
more-burdensome/less-burdensome one is problematic. There 
are some forms of enhancement that would require a fairly 
small restriction on liberty (for example, taking a particular di-
etary supplement once a week while pregnant that is shown to 
improve the intelligence of resulting children beyond the nor-
mal range) while there are some actions one would need to take 
to avoid diminishment that will involve significant limitations 
on one‘s life choices (for example, being unable to reproduce as 
a single or same-sex individual, or being subject to criminal 
sanction unless one chooses a reproductive partner other than 
one‘s genetic sibling with whom one is in love).216 If what mat-
ters to us is the level of restriction in relation to how much bet-
ter the world would be in an impersonal sense, it might be bet-
ter to draw the line on that criterion directly rather than using 
 
 212. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF 
HUMAN CLONING 3, 17–24 (Leon R. Kass & James Q. Wilson eds., 1998). 
 213. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 170–72. 
 214. Id. at 179–82. 
 215. See id. at 187–91. 
 216. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 91–94 (discussing a similar point in 
criminal law). 
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the enhancement-distinction as a muddled heuristic. That 
would, however, still allow the state to legally require some en-
hancements. 
It is still open to us to take the other horn of the dilemma 
and accept a symmetrical duty to enhance such that the State 
can justifiably use the same legal interventions as in Part II, 
not only to induce substitutions of ‗normal‘ for diminished 
children but also to induce the substitution of enhanced child-
ren for ‗normal‘ ones. For some, this implication of the non-
person-affecting principle approach may be unsettling enough 
to justify rejecting it. For others, the intuitive discomfort of 
supporting legally enforceable duties to enhance can be miti-
gated by introducing limiting principles such as requiring ex-
tremely large non-person-affecting benefits and the least intru-
sive of the means of influencing the target reproductive 
decision (see Table 1 above). However, whatever cabining we 
must do on the enhancement side to make the non-person-
affecting principle approach plausible ought to apply equally on 
the diminishment side. I believe many of the interventions jus-
tified by BIRC will not be supportable on the non-person-
affecting principle, when appropriately cabined. 
b. The Specter of the New Eugenics 
A different kind of concern with the non-person-affecting 
principle approach as a substitute for BIRC is that it relies on 
objectionable eugenic premises. Expressively it threatens to 
suggest to a member of the set of individuals it targets (or at 
least to the children who sneak past its gates and come into ex-
istence): ―we are expending state resources to prevent people 
like you from coming into existence because we think the world 
is better off if people like you (physically disabled, mentally re-
tarded, raised by gay or single parents, etc.) were replaced by 
other people.‖ This is a far cry from the goal of preventing harm 
to vulnerable populations that underlies much of the appeal of 
BIRC reasoning. This is not to say that such reasoning is nec-
essarily invalid, but it does require a direct confrontation with 
the eugenics movements of old and the question of what made 
the ―old‖ eugenics wrong?  
Eugenics was the term coined by Darwin‘s cousin Francis 
Galton for the ―science of improving stock—not only by judi-
cious mating, but whatever tends to give the more suitable rac-
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es or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing over the less 
suitable than they otherwise would have had.‖217 In the first 
half of the 1900s, Galton‘s ideas spread as both a research pro-
gram and a social movement to Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Brazil, Denmark, and even the United States218—
where the Race Better Foundation headed by John Kellogg at-
tracted ten thousand visitors at the Panama-Pacific exposition 
of 1915219 and the American Museum of Natural History hosted 
large exhibits in 1915 and 1932220—and it was popular in the 
inter-war era not only among conservatives, but also Progres-
sives and Scandinavian Social Democrats who sought to use 
eugenic reasoning as the basis for the social welfare state.221 In 
U.S. law it is most famously associated with Justice Holmes‘s 
claim in Buck v. Bell that ―[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough‖ as a reason to uphold a Virginia policy of involuntarily 
sterilizing an allegedly ―feeble-minded‖ who had already pro-
duced one ―feeble-minded‖ child.222 Eugenics was notorious as a 
central part of the Nazi movement that seized on the notion of 
blood and called for the purification of the nation‘s gene pool in 
order to ―regain the nobility and greatness of their genetically 
pure forebears,‖ and gave rise to prohibitions on sexual rela-
tions between Jews and Aryans, ―Genetic Courts passing judg-
ment on [] genetic fitness,‖ marriage advice clinics, and ulti-
mately mass sterilization and euthanasia programs targeting 
―Jews and other minorities.‖223  
While the rationale of the non-person-affecting principle 
sounds a lot like that of the old eugenics movement, as Bucha-
nan and his co-authors caution, ―the central theses of a social 
movement, including its moral premises, ought not be dis-
missed because of the intellectual and ethical failings of its ad-
herents.‖224 Yes, ―[e]ugenics is recalled as the Nazis‘ racial doc-
trine, which it was, but to be a eugenicist, then or now, is not 
 
 217. See BUCHANAN, ET AL., supra note 32, at 30. For an excellent compre-
hensive history of eugenics, see generally DIANE PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN 
HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT (1998). 
 218. PAUL, supra note 217, at 31. 
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 221. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 32–37. 
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tantamount to being a Nazi,‖ or at least not necessarily.225 In 
more colloquial terms, we ought to be wary of trying to score 
points by comparing our opponents to Nazis.  
Tracing what was and was not wrong with the eugenics 
movement is a book-length project. Here, I limit myself to brief-
ly examining two possible ways in which what we might call 
the ―new‖ eugenics—the means of state intervention in repro-
ductive decision-making discussed in Part II—might be justi-
fied and distinguished from the old eugenics of the Nazis.  
The first distinction would focus on the means used to re-
gulate reproduction rather than the reasons for that use. The 
Nazi eugenics movement used murder and sterilization as some 
of its primary means of controlling reproduction.226 One could 
argue that the old eugenics‘ badness departs from the evils of 
those means not used by the new eugenics. 
I do not find this distinction persuasive. To be sure, invo-
luntary sterilization involves an invasion of bodily integrity, a 
kind of interest that is often accorded particular normative and 
constitutional protection.227 But it seems to be a fetishization of 
bodily integrity to say the imposition of criminal sanction to 
achieve the same ends is not equally objectionable. To use an 
extreme example, can we really conclude that an attempt to 
criminalize all reproductive activity by Jews or Gypsies would 
be appreciably less abhorrent than achieving that same result 
through sterilization? The Nazis did both after all, and on some 
accounts one might even conclude that sterilization is the less-
bad alternative.  
That said, while distinctions between sterilization and cri-
minalization seem insufficient to do the work of avoiding the 
badness of the old eugenics, things are less clear as to some of 
the other less intrusive means. Imagine the State decided not 
to enforce surrogacy contracts only as to a category of parents 
who were likely to produce significant non-person-affecting 
harms—some states already refuse judicial pre-clearance (and 
thus enforcement) of surrogacy agreements when the intending 
parents are not a married heterosexual couple.228 Or suppose 
that instead the State sought to fund abstinence education pro-
grams that target only particular subgroups likely to produce 
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these non-person-affecting harms, for example those with her-
itable disabilities such as deafness. This would certainly be less 
bad than involuntarily sterilization, but even the funding of in-
formational interventions to dissuade reproduction carries with 
it a worrisome message. And while one might distinguish the 
message ―your existence is so unworthy that it should be pre-
vented‖ from ―your existence reduces welfare from an imper-
sonal standpoint compared to the children who might have 
been born in your place,‖ that distinction is one that is likely to 
be lost on most listeners. Still, at least for the less intrusive 
means, this may offer some room between the new and old eu-
genics. 
A second distinction would suggest that the badness of the 
old eugenics movement stemmed from its targeting of genetic 
unfitness and the transmission of genes as the source of harm. 
If one accepts even a moderate form of genetic essentialism in 
which one‘s genes are at least partially constitutive of who one 
is, this constituted a deep rejection of the person—―we want to 
prevent the existence of future people like you.‖ By contrast, at 
least some of the examples discussed in Part II focus on pre-
venting children from coming into being whose rearing condi-
tions (single parent, unaware of parent‘s identity, etc.) are bad 
on non-person-affecting grounds. Even the criminalization of 
brother-sister adult incest where the harm results (at least in 
part) from genetic abnormalities might be rationalized not as a 
rejection of the person and their genetic make-up but merely as 
a condemnation of their reproduction with a particular other 
person—though here the move may be too clever by half since 
the worry is that each of the two people may carry a ―bad‖ re-
cessive gene. If a necessary condition of the wrongfulness of the 
old eugenics was the condemnation of the reproducing person 
this too may distinguish the new eugenics. 
Although tempting, such a distinction is slippery in that 
while these examples may not require condemning a person as 
a repository of genes, in some instances they do nonetheless 
condemn the person. Individuals are condemned for reproduc-
ing when gay, single, of a certain age, etc., because of the wel-
fare of populations that will result. Why is that less troubling 
than the condemnation of the individual because of their genet-
ic make-up leading to the same effect? Holding this line might 
require a very strong form of genetic essentialism or perhaps 
some form of luck egalitarianism—the idea that individuals 
should not be held responsible for brute luck things they could 
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not help (such as genetic traits) but should be held responsible 
for option luck choices they do make.229 The old eugenics prob-
lematically limited the reproductive liberty of individuals be-
cause their reproduction had consequences they could not help, 
the argument goes, but the new eugenics penalizes them only 
for decisions that fall within option luck. Such a defense would 
require overcoming many of the stock objections to luck egali-
tarianism,230 as well as maintaining the brute-option luck dis-
tinction as to these cases, which seems quite difficult. Some 
(not conclusive) research suggests that at least one case—that 
of restrictions on LGBT access to reproductive technologies—
might involve at least partially genetically determined ‗choices‘ 
moving it to the brute luck and therefore bad eugenics side.231 
Many of the other cases—one‘s propensity to become a teenage 
mother, one‘s attraction to a sibling, whether one is single—
might be thought to have many brute luck elements to them 
even though not genetic brute luck. To the extent we are re-
stricting individuals from reproducing due to criteria that are 
not their fault, the gap between the ―new‖ and ―old‖ eugenics 
thus narrows.  
For all these reasons, I find the difficulty in distinguishing 
the practices discussed in Part II from the old eugenics to con-
stitute an additional problem faced by the non-person-affecting 
principle view as BIRC substitute, but perhaps not as serious a 
problem as the others I have outlined above.  
4. Can Criminal Law Restrictions on Reproduction be 
Justified by Non-Person-Affecting Principles? 
A more fundamental, but admittedly more contestable ob-
jection, is that even if we concede that non-person-affecting 
principles make one of the actions discussed in Part II wrongful 
in a moral sense, it is not the kind of wrong the law may justi-
fiably target through criminal sanction on reproductive activi-
ties. 
One might think that to justify the serious restriction on 
liberty posed by criminal sanctions on reproduction requires a 
 
 229. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETH-
ICS 287, 291 (1999); Nir Eyal, Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice, J. ETH-
ICS & SOC. PHIL., Jan. 2007, at 1–2; Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism 
and Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271, 272–73 (2008). 
 230. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 229, at 274. 
 231. See, e.g., David France, The Science of Gaydar, N.Y. MAG., June 17, 
2007, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/33520/. 
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victim, someone to be harmed or wronged who has standing to 
complain about the act by the perpetrator, even if prosecution 
is done by ―the People.‖ Even in inchoate crimes, the State cri-
minalizes an act that had a probability of harming someone, 
even if that harm was not actually realized.232 By contrast, the 
non-person-affecting principle approach would target actions 
that harm no one; instead the evil is the failure to produce a po-
tential population with less suffering or more opportunity, and 
the argument is that these should not be the kinds of actions 
for which I can be locked up or subject to bodily invasion, such 
as forced sterilization. On this view criminal law is special in 
that it expresses the approbation of the community and impos-
es a particular kind of sanction, all the more so when it targets 
as private and personal an activity as reproduction. 
Eric Rakowski captures the idea in part when he observes 
that ―[t]he person-affecting restriction encapsulates an appar-
ently attractive moral thesis: the only morally cognizable 
harms or benefits are those to existing people.‖233 My thesis in 
this Section is actually weaker: Even if these claims are moral-
ly cognizable they may not justify legal interventions that seek 
to use criminal penalties or bodily integrity infringement to 
limit reproduction. This is a kind of separate spheres view that 
suggests that, while non-person-affecting goods may be worth 
pursuing all things being equal, as legal matter they should not 
be traded off against serious person-affecting harms that flow 
from the criminalization of reproductive acts. Jan Narveson 
quipped that, ―[W]e are in favor of making people happy, but 
neutral about making happy people.‖234 Here the claim is that a 
state may be more justified in adopting criminal law interven-
tions to prevent harming people (who do exist or will certainly 
exist) than to cause the production of people who have a wel-
fare of X rather than a different set of people who would have a 
higher welfare of Y. 
 
 232. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justi-
fying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
141, 152 (2011) (explaining the practice of, and theory behind, preventative 
criminalization). 
 233. Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1345, 1387 (2002). In fact, to be more precise we should probably amend Ra-
kowski‘s last words from ―to existing people‖ to ―to existing people, and those 
who will come into existence irrespective of our policy choice.‖ 
 234. Jan Narveson, Moral Problems of Population, 57 MONIST 80 (1973). 
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Why do I want to suggest that such regulation may be 
beyond the moral limits of the criminal law? My argument be-
gins with the view that interventions that seek to criminalize 
conduct (or invade bodily integrity, but from here on I will just 
speak of criminalization) require particularly persuasive justi-
fications, and thus not every reason a state may have for 
achieving an end will pass muster if this is the form of the in-
tervention. This is a theme that has pervaded this Article, be-
ginning with the taxonomy I introduced in Part I, and on its 
own it does not seem terribly controversial. This might be 
thought of as a limitation on the strength of the reason or as a 
limitation on the type of the reason—not every type of reason 
for acting counts as sufficient to justify the criminalization of 
conduct.  
The next step is to suggest that the non-person-affecting 
principle approach—which argues for the creation of one poten-
tial population over another—is not as persuasive a reason for 
criminalizing conduct as person-affecting arguments such as 
the prevention of harm to already existing individuals (or to 
those like Feinberg‘s kindergarteners who will exist irrespec-
tive of our policy choice). To be precise, we can identify at least 
five possible positions as to the relationship between person-
affecting and non-person-affecting harms/benefits, at least in 
their ability to justify criminalizing reproductive acts: The first 
is ―on par.‖ The two count equally such that we ought to be in-
different between an equally sized prevention of harm to exist-
ing individuals (the person-affecting harm) versus creating a 
population that has the same size welfare differential over the 
other possible population (I will call this the ―the non-person-
affecting ‗harm‘‖ with ‗scare quotes‘ around ‗harm‘ to indicate 
that it is not really harm in the usual sense but instead the dif-
ference in welfare between two potential populations). The 
second possibility is ―non-person-affecting discounted,‖ in which 
the prevention of non-person-affecting ‗harm‘ counts but not as 
much (or in the same way) as the prevention of the same size 
person-affecting harm. The third possibility is ―non-person af-
fecting does not count,‖ in which we ignore non-person-affecting 
‗harms‘ altogether, but count the prevention of person-affecting 
harms. The last two possibilities, which I think can be rejected 
fairly easily, flip the last two—―person-affecting discount‖ and 
―person-affecting does not count‖ would discount or not count 
the person-affecting harms, respectively.  
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If ―on par‖ is correct then my claims in this subsection 
should fail and non-person-affecting principles should count as 
perfectly good reasons for criminalizing reproductive behavior, 
though they still face the other challenges I have laid out in 
this part. If by contrast ―non-person-affecting does not count‖ is 
true, then my argument in this subsection fully succeeds. If 
―non-person-affecting discounted‖ is true, the justifiability of 
these interventions would depend on the size of the aggregated 
person-affecting harms of this type (the set back of the inter-
ests of would-be reproducers whose liberty is curtailed) and the 
size of the aggregated non-person-affecting ‗harm‘ prevention 
accomplished by the intervention, and how much one discounts 
the non-person-affecting ‗harm‘ in the calculus. 
Why doubt ―on par‖? Begin with a thought experiment: 
Imagine you saw that your seven year-old-son was about to be 
hit by a car and would become a paraplegic. How much of your 
own body would you risk if you knew you could get him out of 
the way? Would you risk the same amount to produce a child 
who had healthy use of his limbs rather than born a paraplegic, 
or would you risk less? If the answer is that you would risk 
less, on par seems to get it wrong just as a matter of how we 
choose for ourselves, which is not even getting to the question of 
what the State may permissibly force us to do through threat of 
criminal sanction. This would suggest that preventing harm to 
already-existing people of size 5 (to use an arbitrary number) 
gets priority over creating future person X instead of Y where 
the difference in their welfare is also 5. 
Of course, as with all intuition pumps, we have to be cau-
tious; it is possible what is really motivating this response is 
concern for the additional trauma to ourselves of our child‘s los-
ing something good like walking, rather than if the child never 
had that ability to begin with, or the psychological bonding we 
have to an existing child. It is unclear whether any amount of 
introspection can help us sort this out, so let me try a less emo-
tionally fraught thought experiment by adapting one Rakowski 
has himself adapted from Parfit (although Rakowski uses it dif-
ferently than I do): 
There are two rare genetic conditions, A and B, which can be detected 
only by special tests and which, by different routes, produce the same 
serious disability in children. If a woman has condition A, she must 
undergo medical treatment for at least one month prior to conception 
to bear a non-disabled baby. Condition B afflicts children. If a child is 
born with condition B, doctors can cure it during the second month of 
an infant‘s life; after the window closes, no cure is possible. 
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  Suppose that the government has funds for only one of two medi-
cal programs. Program A would test millions of women who wished to 
become pregnant. Those found to have condition A would be warned 
to undergo treatment and to delay conception for at least one month, 
until their treatment was complete. Program B would test millions of 
infants. Those found to have condition B would be treated so that they 
would develop normally.235 
Suppose that the costs of running the two programs are 
such that one program is just slightly cheaper and therefore 
that implementing Program A would lead parents to substitute 
1,003 children without disabilities for 1,003 children with dis-
abilities—different children would come into existence—while 
Program B would only cure the disability of 1,000 existing 
children. On the ―on par‖ view we ought to always prefer Pro-
gram A, for as Rakowski puts it ―how could we be morally com-
pelled to choose a medical program that leads to more disabled 
children?‖236 I, however, think that this is exactly the opposite 
of what our intuitions would tell us—that many would favor 
Program B because we should choose to prevent harm to exist-
ing individuals instead of pursuing the impersonal good by 
bringing into existence new individuals with higher welfare, 
individuals who will not be harmed if born with a disability for 
the reasons identified by the Non-Identity Problem.  
Perhaps you are not sure if you would choose Program A or 
Program B. In that case, let me add an additional fact that may 
help clarify your own views. Imagine I now tell you that while 
Program B will cure 1,000 children already existing of the disa-
bility, that the screening offered by Program A, if put into prac-
tice now, will insure that 1,003 children will come into exis-
tence without the disability (as opposed to 1003 who would 
have the disability) not now but ten generations from now. If 
this makes you more likely to favor Program B, then that is an 
additional reason to doubt the view that person and non-
person-affecting harms should be treated ―on par,‖ for the gen-
erational distance should be irrelevant for the non-person-
affecting approach.237  
 
 235. Rakowski, supra note 233, at 1379.  
 236. Id. at 1381.  
 237. Again we must be wary of intuition pumps smuggling in other as-
sumptions. If, for example, the reason why generational distance mattered to 
you is that you are imagining that ten generations from now we will have de-
veloped other cures for disability or that our society would be more disability-
accommodating, that might give you a reason to favor Program B independent 
of whether ―on par‖ is true. I could tell you to assume away these facts and ask 
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Indeed, to put the point most forcefully, ―on par‖ seems to 
carry with it the counter-intuitive implication that if offered 
the choice of devoting resources to curing or preventing a harm 
to an already existing person versus devoting resources to pro-
duce a future person with an equivalent welfare differential, we 
ought to be indifferent between harm-prevention and replace-
ment. 
Suppose these thought experiments have convinced you 
that ―on par‖ is problematic. There are, nonetheless, two sepa-
rate types of responses one might make to my claim that the 
non-person-affecting principle approach may justify criminal 
sanction on reproductive activities. The first response is that 
my argument has only rejected ―on par‖ in a forced choice ra-
tioning setting. It does not necessarily follow that ―on par‖ 
ought to be rejected as a valid basis for the criminalization of 
conduct in the reproductive setting. Here the person-affecting 
harm we are allowing to occur is the setting back of the inter-
ests of the would-be parents in making the reproductive deci-
sions the law tries to prevent (i.e., the regulation discussed in 
Part II). The second response is that even if I have successfully 
given an argument for rejecting ―on par‖ in the criminalization 
of conduct, I have not rejected ―non-person-affecting dis-
counted,‖ which would hold that that non-person affecting 
‗harms‘ do not count the same as person-affecting ones, but 
they do still count. 
The first response might actually be helpful to my argu-
ment. While the State may face moral limits in rationing, they 
are not nearly as strict as the moral limits of the criminal law. 
Thus, if ―on par‖ is not convincing as a justification for ration-
ing decisions, one might think it should a fortiori not be con-
 
whether your intuition remained, but one might wonder whether you really 
banished those facts or merely thought you did. I accept this as a more general 
problem with the intuition pump methodology—another reason why I offer 
this critique of non-person-affecting principles more tentatively than the oth-
ers—but I know of no other method to get at what we think the right answer 
on this issue should be.  
Some might instead appeal to future discounting, that illness is less bad 
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur in the future even if we are not any 
better equipped to deal with them. Whether to discount, and what to discount 
is the subject to pervasive and complex disagreements among philosophers 
and economists that I will not try to resolve here. For a good introduction for 
legal academics, see generally Lewis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discount-
ing Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 79 (2007). 
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vincing as a justification for imposing criminal law sanctions on 
reproduction. In any event, in discussing the second response, I 
shift to a thought experiment that actually uses criminal law 
sanction rather than rationing. 
The second response may or may not hurt my argument. If 
non-person-affecting ‗harms‘ are discounted to a sufficient ex-
tent, then, in the cases discussed in Part II, whatever differ-
ence obtains between the welfare of the populations that would 
come into existence with versus without the intervention once 
discounted are unlikely to be significant enough to justify crim-
inal restrictions on reproduction or bodily integrity violations. 
In a way similar to my earlier discussion of imperfect Non-
Identity Problems in Part III.B, how much of a discount factor 
is required to reach that conclusion will vary with the weight 
one gives to reproductive liberty; the more weight one gives re-
productive liberty, the less discounting of non-person-affecting 
‗harms‘ is needed to reach that conclusion. How much of a dis-
count factor would be required also varies intervention-by-
intervention based on the size of the welfare difference between 
the welfare of the populations that would come into existence. 
While this is of course one of the most important aspects of any 
critique of the viability of the non-person-affecting principle as 
an alternative to BIRC type justifications, as with the discus-
sion of lives not worth living in Part III.A, I think the welfare 
difference due to the genetic abnormalities from incest is the 
most plausible case where such a calculus might in the end 
permit the criminal sanction, but the others seem far-off given 
even very minimal discounting. 
Now we could sidestep this need to determine the discount 
factor and the other variables in the calculus altogether if we 
could go further and actually rule out ―non-person-affecting 
discounted‖ in favor of the stronger position that ―non-person 
affecting does not count,‖ at least in the limited domain of justi-
fying criminal sanction. Can one persuasively do so? One possi-
ble way is to employ a veil of ignorance device and ask whether 
behind such a veil one would endorse a principle that allowed 
the State to pursue non-person-affecting goods at the expense 
of limitations on your reproductive liberty, of either the crimi-
nalization or bodily integrity type. Not knowing who you will be 
in society, I ask you whether you would be willing to risk the 
chance that it would be your reproductive desires the State will 
stymie through criminalization (e.g., you are the single individ-
ual, the gay one, the individual over 50, etc.) not in order to 
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prevent harm to existing people or people who will necessarily 
exist in the future, but instead to ensure that population X 
where children have less suffering and more opportunity comes 
into existence sometime in the future, instead of population Y 
who does not have these things.238 Once again, to really test 
this intuition we should ask you whether you would agree to 
this rule even if it meant criminalizing your reproductive con-
duct today to create a difference in population welfare that 
would only manifest itself ten generations thereafter, since tem-
poral distance should be irrelevant on the non-person-affecting 
view. My own intuition in such a case is that I would not au-
thorize the government to act in this way, whatever the size of 
the non-person-affecting gain to be had, for the selfish reason 
that there is nothing in it for me, only risk.  
One might counter that this is not entirely true. It may be 
the case that I am the person who comes into existence with 
the higher rather than the lower welfare—but that seems to ac-
tually recapitulate the problematic reasoning of BIRC: the 
choice is not higher-welfare me versus lower-welfare me, but 
the welfare of person A versus the welfare of person B. And re-
member, no one is harmed if not brought into existence, so it is 
not clear why I should care. If that is right, then non-person-
affecting principles cannot justify criminal or bodily integrity 
violative interventions on reproduction at all. 
Of course, like all veil of ignorance type arguments, this 
one is subject to variances in intuitions and critiques about 
whether the veil is thick or thin enough in terms of the descrip-
tion of what the chooser knows.239 This is one reason why I am 
 
 238. One concern one might raise with this hypothetical is ―I would not 
support the intervention even if it prevented the anticipated harm to an exist-
ing child.‖ For such a person I have made the case against these interventions 
so forcefully that we need not get into this level of complexity, and I can take a 
breather. Even this person, though, may encounter a harm-intervention pair-
ing that they find justifies intervening if harm to existing children was pre-
vented. As long as she can construct for herself one such case where she sup-
ports intervening to prevent harm to existing children but not to ensure an 
equivalent welfare differential between bringing population Y rather than X 
into existence, she has rejected on par and can continue reading this discus-
sion using that example in her head.  
 239. Indeed, Parfit has suggested that these veil methods are not useful 
when they require imagining not coming into existence as one of the possibili-
ties, that while ―we can imagine a different possible history, in which we never 
existed . . . we cannot assume that, in the actual history of the world, it might 
be true that we never exist and thus we cannot ask what, on this assumption, 
it would be rational to choose.‖ PARFIT, supra note 32, at 392. Of course, Par-
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more tentative about this critique of the non-person-affecting 
principle approach than the others discussed. While I think I 
have clearly made the case for at least discounting non-person-
affecting principles as reasons for criminalizing reproductive 
conduct of the type discussed in Part II, the case for ruling 
these reasons out altogether is less certain. 
To be clear, the discussion in this subsection has been di-
rected towards a particular means of regulating reproduction 
that require exceedingly compelling justifications: Those that 
criminalize reproductive conduct or invade bodily integrity. Ex-
cluding (or at least discounting) non-person-affecting principles 
as justifications for these interventions need not mean one has 
to do the same as to all the possible interventions in the tax-
onomy developed in Part I. This is just to re-iterate the prior 
point that there are moral limits to the criminal law or the in-
vasion of bodily integrity that are not present as to other forms 
of state action.240  
Thus, it seems to me that for informational interventions 
the State might more justifiably adopt a non-person-affecting 
principle as support. Although it would not be a pithy billboard, 
it does not seem particularly problematic for the State to urge 
people as part of abstinence education that ―waiting until you 
are older results in less suffering and less limited opportunity 
in the world and is thus good (in an impersonal sense).‖ Selec-
tive funding of assisted reproduction is somewhat closer but 
may also be potentially justifiable on non-person-affecting prin-
ciples since if the State has no obligation to fund X (and espe-
cially if it is rationing funding), it does not seem objectionable 
for it to choose to fund only instances of X that do not involve 
creating individuals who experience more suffering or limited 
opportunity, at least when the reproducers could have done 
otherwise.241 Selectively invalidating contracts or assigning pa-
 
fit‘s own thought experiments require imagining all sorts of odd things (like 
having half one‘s brain put in one person and half in another), so one might 
beg to differ with him on how far imagination can stretch.  
 240. This concession parallels one Feinberg makes as to his rejection of Le-
gal Moralism, that harmless immoralities might properly be targeted through 
subsidies or educational programs promoting a particular vision of the good 
life, just not criminal prohibition. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 312–13 (1984) (harmless immo-
ralities might properly be targeted through subsidies or educational programs 
promoting a particular vision of the good life, just not criminal prohibition).  
 241. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 14, at 500–09 (discussing whether the 
State has an obligation to fund reproductive technologies). 
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rental status in order to serve non-person-affecting goals seems 
to fall somewhere in between, although my own sense is that 
they should fall closer to the impermissible use of criminal 
sanction because of their serious negative liberty consequences, 
but that is an argument to be fleshed out for another day.  
To be sure, I think this claim about the relationship of non-
person-affecting principles and the moral limits of the criminal 
law is more controversial. Although I find it convincing on its 
own terms, even without it, I believe the other arguments I 
have offered above sufficiently favor rejecting the non-person-
affecting principle approach as an adequate reformulation of 
BIRC that can justify the interventions discussed in Part II.  
D.  SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  
Whether the interventions discussed Part II are normative-
ly justified by BIRC or its reformulations is a distinct question 
from whether those justifications are constitutionally sufficient 
as a doctrinal matter under U.S. law. My analysis has focused 
on the former, but I want to make a few brief and tentative 
suggestions regarding implications for the constitutional ques-
tion.  
As I and others have elsewhere suggested, the level of 
scrutiny (rational basis, strict scrutiny, or something interme-
diate like the ―undue burden‖ standard from Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey)242 under which the 
kinds of regulations of reproduction I have been discussing 
would be judged (especially those involving reproductive tech-
nologies) is underdetermined by the existing case law. The only 
U.S. Supreme Court decision to consider whether there is a 
fundamental right to become a genetic parent, Skinner v. Ok-
lahoma—finding a fundamental right that was violated by 
physical sterilization of individuals convicted three or more 
times of crimes of moral turpitude but not for embezzlement—
is subject to a myriad of possible interpretations, especially as 
applied to reproductive technologies.243 That uncertainty is 
 
 242. 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992). 
 243. 316 U.S. 535, 536–39 (1942); see, e.g., VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECK-
LESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR-TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN 
EUGENICS 165 (2008) (concluding that ―both liberals and conservatives have 
made a mistake‖ in their reading of Skinner because the case was ―neither ar-
gued nor decided as a case about rights in the sense that we use the term ‗fun-
damental right‘ today‖); CARL WELLMAN, MEDICAL LAW AND MORAL RIGHTS 
145–46 (2005) (reading Skinner as limited to marriage); Cohen, Genetic Par-
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compounded by other unresolved substantive Due Process de-
bates: the debate between those adopting an ―intimacy‖ versus 
―Due Process traditionalist‖ approach to substantive due 
process;244 the debate over the level of generality with which we 
characterize the right at issue245 —it is easier to find a funda-
mental ―right to procreate‖ writ large grounded in Skinner and 
historical analogues than a ―right to use an anonymous sperm 
donor‖; and uncertainty whether new fundamental rights 
claims that build off existing decisions (Skinner in this case) 
will be ‗grandfathered‘ in or instead revisited under the more 
traditionalist approach. Further complicating the question is 
that while cases of the denial of services based on age, marital 
status, and sexuality ordinarily only merit rational basis re-
view when discrimination against these categories of persons is 
alleged, it is also possible that, when combined with the in-
creased substantive due process protection of procreative activ-
ities, heightened scrutiny (of the intermediate or strict variety) 
may be warranted in these cases as a matter of equal protec-
tion (one reading of what happened in Skinner itself).246 
A full analysis would have to consider BIRC and each of its 
reformulations under each possible tier of scrutiny. I hope to 
undertake that fuller analysis on another occasion, but here I 
examine the matter only through the prism of rational basis, 
and focus on BIRC itself. Interventions that fail rational basis 
will a fortiori fail heightened scrutiny. Moreover, if strict scru-
tiny was the appropriate review, many of these interventions 
would also have problems more directly related to the underin-
clusivity problem I sketched above. That is, because there are 
many cases where under BIRC or its reformulations there are 
comparable probabilities and severity of deficits to children 
 
ent, supra note 5, at 1148–67; Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative 
Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. DEV. L.J. 1, 44 (2007) (reading Skinner as protect-
ing only a right to ―self-replace‖ and thus a fundamental right to only one or 
two children per couple).  
 244. See, e.g., Cohen, Constitution, supra note 5, at 1159–60; Cass R. Suns-
tein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543 (2008). Compare Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. at 851 (intimacy) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003) (intimacy), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21, 727 
(1997) (due process traditionalism).  
 245. Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–22, and Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (narrow), with Michael H. 491 U.S. at 139 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (expansive). 
 246. See Rao, supra note 83, at 1474–88 (discussing Equal Protection chal-
lenges for denials of access to reproductive technology). 
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where the State has not acted in similar ways (including those 
involving coital reproduction), a court is unlikely to find these 
interventions as ―narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest‖ under strict scrutiny, just as the Skinner 
Court found that Oklahoma‘s distinction between sterilization 
of ―those who [had] thrice committed grand larceny‖ and those 
who had thrice embezzled was constitutionally problematic.247 
While the State might argue that the difficulties it would face 
in its ability to enforce the rule on the natural reproduction 
side is sufficient to distinguish the two cases, it is far from clear 
that this is a winning argument. 
Even under rational basis review‘s very deferential stan-
dard requiring only that the statute bear ―a reasonable relation 
to a legitimate state interest,‖248 BIRC justifications should fail 
for perfect Non-Identity Problem cases because no one is 
harmed such that this justification is irrational. BIRC justifica-
tions for perfect Non-Identity problems will therefore, a fortiori, 
fail intermediate and strict scrutiny. By contrast, in the imper-
fect cases the statutes are likely to survive rational basis review 
because so long as ―any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify‖ a legislative enactment, it satisfies that scru-
tiny.249 A small enough probability of harm to a small enough 
population of resulting children (especially if the harm itself is 
small) might make the intervention actually irrational given 
the burden it places on a much larger population. But the ques-
tion under this review is whether a legislature could conceiva-
bly have estimated the probability, population size affected, 
and harm severity in such a way that the intervention was ra-
tional. Given the usual deference, I think the answer is yes, 
and thus there is an important divergence from the normative 
analysis that I have argued should treat perfect and imperfect 
cases more alike.  
 
 247. By contrast, if rational basis review applies the failure of the State to 
go after all similar is unproblematic, in that the Court has permitted legisla-
tion to conclude that ―[e]vils in the same field may be of different dimensions 
and proportions, requiring different remedies . . . [o]r the reform may take one 
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most 
acute to the legislative mind . . . [or t]he legislature may select one phase of 
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others‖. Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
 248. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722; see also Robertson, supra note 86, at 
347 (making a similar point for denials of access to reproductive technologies 
for LGBT populations).  
 249. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1960). 
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A similar logic might apply to a justification that these in-
terventions prevent lives not worth living, but first there is a 
threshold question of whether preventing lives not worth living 
is a legitimate state interest. While I have suggested that it is 
implausible that any of the interventions discussed in Part II 
actually prevent lives not worth living, on rational basis review 
all a court must determine to sustain the intervention is that 
the legislature could rationally have reached that conclusion. 
Thus, the kinds of uncertainty evinced by courts in wrongful 
life cases as to whether a particular condition produces a life 
not worth living is not an obstacle; here, the courts would be 
deferring to a hypothetical legislative judgment on the matter 
and their own uncertainty might cut in favor of that deference. 
Except perhaps for the incest case, I think in the rest of these 
cases a claim by the State that ―children born to single parents 
will have lives not worth living‖ seems likely to exceed even the 
extreme deference given to legislatures under rational basis re-
view. In any event, for political reasons, I think it unlikely that 
governments would defend statutes on this theory in most of 
the examples I have discussed.  
It is unclear whether the pursuit of non-person-affecting 
principles approach constitutes a legitimate (or for that matter 
compelling) state interest. Preventing significant externalized 
costs from reproduction might be such an interest, but this ap-
proach represents the State‘s interest in the nature of the popu-
lation that comes into existence in the future that is uncon-
nected to the externalities different possible populations of 
future persons might impose on already-existing individuals or 
the state. As Phillip Peters has put the matter there is an ―un-
answered question [of] whether the courts will be skeptical of 
state laws prohibiting conduct that does not make any specific 
individual worse off.‖250 His most specific argument in favor of 
the constitutionality of this approach (to be fair, delivered in a 
very short paragraph in a twelve-page book chapter) is to rely 
on the presumed constitutionality of incest laws,251 but it is this 
very example that my work seeks to question, and as I have 
shown in Part II most of the courts that have passed on its con-
stitutionality have relied on the (I hope) now-discredited BIRC 
justification. There are also further questions of whether the 
limitation to same-number cases is a constitutional limitation. 
 
 250. Peters, supra note 199, at 323.  
 251. Id. at 329. 
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Again I emphasize the tentative and brief nature of this 
analysis: it does not consider intermediate standards of review, 
nor have I pressed on how differences between the kinds of 
means used to regulate reproduction might interface with the 
justifications in a constitutional sense.252 My goal here has 
been to start a conversation about the way in which the norma-
tive and constitutional analyses are in some places symmetrical 
and in others divergent. There is much more to be said, and I 
hope to say it in further work. At the very least, though, my ac-
count renders problematic the claims of Radhika Rao, Marsha 
Garrison, and others on the presumed constitutionally of BIRC-
justified regulations of reproduction and the suggestion it flows 
ineluctably from the constitutionality of similar regulation of 
adoption.253 
  CONCLUSION—BEYOND BEST INTERESTS   
In this Article I have shown a deep tendency for courts, leg-
islatures, and scholars to appeal to a particular kind of justifi-
cation for interventions that influence when, whether, and with 
whom we reproduce: Best Interests of the Resulting Child 
(BIRC). I have shown that the Non-Identity Problem makes 
this form of justification problematic, and that this parallels 
the existing rejection of wrongful life tort liability. Neverthe-
less, I have suggested that appeals to BIRC reasoning remain 
pervasive, reflecting the transposition of settled family law and 
the political theory advantages of adopting a Millian Harm 
Principle justification for protecting vulnerable populations.  
I have also considered three attempts to save the BIRC 
view by reformulating it. The first would expand the category of 
lives not worth living; the second would accept BIRC reasoning 
but limit it to the imperfect Non-Identity Problem cases dis-
cussed in Part II; the third would replace it with a non-person-
affecting principle justification which claims that the wrongful-
ness of the parental action stems from the failure to substitute 
a child who would experience less suffering or more opportuni-
 
 252. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1234–40 (1996) (suggesting that in its free speech, free 
exercise, and abortion jurisprudence that for incidental infringements of 
would-be fundamental rights, the Court has at times applied a substantiality 
threshold). 
 253. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 100, at 1626, 1642; Rao, supra note 83, 
at 1477. 
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ty. I have provided reasons why I think each faces problems 
that make it unworkable.  
Where do we go from here? We have two options: the first 
is to accept that these interventions are unjustified. The second 
is to drop the fig leaf of BIRC and delve into the ―secret ambi-
tion‖ of best interests arguments pertaining to regulating re-
production. I believe there are three families of potential 
frameworks that might still sustain the interventions described 
in Part II, but accepting any of them requires a move away 
from the comfortable, overlapping consensus between compre-
hensive moral theories that BIRC arguments pretend to offer, 
and instead requires adopting more controversial premises. I 
develop these approaches and offer critiques in a companion ar-
ticle.254 Here I merely want to sketch the three possibilities: 
Reproductive Externalities: The Non-Identity Problem 
is an obstacle for any attempt to justify state intervention by 
claiming that the child who would be produced absent the in-
tervention is harmed. What I call the ―reproductive externali-
ties‖ approach sidesteps the Non-Identity Problem by specify-
ing a different victim of the harm: third-parties may be harmed 
by this child‟s existence. These externalities may be intra-
familial or more domain-general ideas about costs to the State 
through disability accommodation, diminished earnings, etc. 
These costs are most tangible as to cases involving the creation 
of children with disabilities, for example the genetic abnormali-
ties stemming from brother-sister incest.  
Wronging While Overall Benefiting: This possibility 
can be understood as shifting the criteria for moral wrongful-
ness from harm to a conception of wrong absent harm or as of-
fering a conception of harm where the fact that an individual is 
overall benefited is insufficient to save the act from being 
wrongful.  
In the wrongful life context, Seanna Shiffrin has developed 
the most fully fleshed out version tied to legal application,255 
but other versions of this approach also exist.256 On Shiffrin‘s 
account, with its non-comparative conception of harm and ben-
 
 254. Cohen, supra note 9. 
 255. Shiffrin, supra note 33, at 119–20. 
 256. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32, at 12; Dillard, supra note 60, at 1131 
n.48; Elizabeth Harman, Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?, 18 PHIL. 
PERSP. 89, 93 (2004); F.M. Kamm, Baselines and Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1367, 1385 (2003); Woodward, supra note 32, at 810.  
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efit, in creating a child we both harm and benefit the child at 
once, and it is wrongful to impose upon a child an unconsented-
to harm merely to confer upon him a ―pure benefit‖ like exis-
tence rather than to remove or prevent a greater harm.257  
Legal Moralism and Virtue Ethics: A third alternative 
is what Joel Feinberg called legal moralism in the narrow 
sense—the use of criminal law to deter acts which neither 
harm nor offend but undermine public morality.258 A related 
approach draws on virtue ethics conceptions, which suggest 
that the character of the agent doing the action is what is cen-
tral in determining its wrongfulness.259 Michael Sandel‘s work 
on an opposite issue, the morality of enhancement, might be 
thought of as one model of where a virtue ethics argument 
might go.260 Both of these approaches side-step the Non-
Identity Problem because they do not depend on a claim that 
the child is harmed by the reproductive act, rather that society 
or the agent reproducing is, in a way that should motivate state 
action.  
As I suggest in a companion article coming out in another 
Issue of this Journal, each of these options faces some serious 
normative and constitutional difficulties as justifications for 
the interventions I have discussed in Part II. Would it be better 
to adopt one (or more) of these alternative possibilities or in-
stead to simply reject these interventions? A full evaluation of 
that question is (in this case quite literally) a matter I leave for 
another paper. Here my goal has been instead to show that the 
way courts, legislatures, and scholars discuss the regulation of 
reproduction is deeply flawed, and cannot be saved. 
 
 257. Shiffrin, supra note 33, at 120–27. 
 258. See FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 24; FEINBERG, supra note 240, at 3–4. 
 259. Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 65–76 
(2006); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-
LOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds.) (rev. ed. 2007), available at http:// plato 
.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
 260. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE 
AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING, passim (2007). 
